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JUSTICE STEVENS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION:
THE LAW BEYOND THE RULES
William D. Araiza∗
This Article considers Justice Stevens’ approach to equal protection
and free speech cases. It contrasts his longstanding attempts to pierce
through mediating doctrinal rules in these areas and apply true
constitutional meaning (“the law beyond the rules”) with the more
rule-bound approach exemplified by Chief Justice Roberts and other
members of the Court’s conservative bloc. While appreciating Justice
Stevens’ efforts in this regard, this Article also recognizes some of the
problems he encountered in his quest. However, it also notes that the
more rule-bound approach suffers from flaws of its own, even when
judged against the criteria more rule-friendly justices offer to evaluate
a given method of constitutional adjudication. Thus, whatever one
might think of the ultimate success of Justice Stevens’ project, it is
surely the case that the more rule-bound approach has not proven its
clear superiority.

∗ Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Article is dedicated to the late David
Leonard, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, who played a major role in my
entering the legal academy and thus making it possible for me to develop whatever knowledge
and insight is reflected here.
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INTRODUCTION
The October 2009 term of the Supreme Court marked both the
fifth anniversary of the Roberts Court and the last term served by
Justice John Paul Stevens. These dual occasions provide an
opportunity to reconsider the longstanding debate over the relative
desirability of rigid doctrinal rules and more flexible standards in
constitutional adjudication. Justice Stevens was a well-known skeptic
of rigid rules in equal protection and First Amendment law, among
other subjects.1 As an alternative, he offered an approach that sought
to decide cases based on principles that he viewed as more directly
grounded in the underlying constitutional guarantee. In his last term
on the Court, he wrote a dissent in the blockbuster case of the year—
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission2—that constituted a
full-throated attack on what he described as the “glittering
generalit[ies]” relied on by the majority.3 Less famously, in that same
term (indeed, in one of the final constitutional cases of the term, and
thus, of his career), he voted in a way that departed from the standard
liberal-conservative divide and aligned himself with an opinion that
adopted a much more context-specific approach to the First
Amendment issue at stake.4
The five-year anniversary of the Roberts Court provides a fitting
minor key for this investigation of the rules-standards debate. As is
well known, Chief Justice Roberts came into office promising
humility—most notably through his analogy between judging and
baseball umpiring. This promise to act like a judge by following the
law (as in simply calling balls and strikes) has a strong connection to
a judicial approach that emphasizes rules. The connection is not a
logical necessity: one can act like a judge while still adopting an
approach like Justice Stevens’. Indeed, Justice Stevens has suggested
1. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, John Paul Stevens, 1992 ANN. SURV. AM. L. at xxv, xxvi
(1992) (“[Justice Stevens] eschews bright-line rules in favor of standards that permit judges
adequate discretion to tailor results to nuanced evaluation of facts and circumstances.”); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 121 (1992)
(describing Justice Stevens as a “justice of standards” as opposed to a “justice of rules”); Kathryn
Watts, From Chevron to Massachusetts: Justice Stevens’ Approach to Securing the Public
Interest, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1044 (2010) (describing Justice Stevens as “a fan of
flexible standards rather than rigid rules”).
2. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3. Id. at 929.
4. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
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that a judge performs her role better by paying careful attention to
facts and context, as opposed to unthinkingly applying rigid legal
rules.5 But, at least on one theory, the rule of law is, in fact, a law of
rules.6 On this theory, humble judging requires strict adherence to
rigid doctrinal formulas in order to cabin judicial adventurism or
good faith but unwitting importation of the judge’s own personal
preferences into the law.7 The well-known debate over substantive
due process has made this argument clear enough.8 Thus, one can
understand Chief Justice Roberts’ commitment to humility as a
counterpoint to Justice Stevens’ allegedly more freewheeling
decisional approach.9
The debate over rules and standards implicates an additional
issue in the particular context of equal protection and First
Amendment jurisprudence. Both the equal protection clause and the
First Amendment are exceptionally vague texts. The former’s
command that states not deprive persons of “the equal protection of
the laws,”10 to the extent it is read as a general command of equal
treatment,11 begs the question of what “equal treatment” requires.12
The latter’s command that Congress shall make “no law . . .

5. See John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300 (1992); see
also Dorsen, supra note 1, at xxv (noting Justice Stevens’ “relentless insistence that issues be
examined ‘context by context’” and “campaigns against the ‘artificiality of black-letter
constitutional law’”).
6. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989) (defending a judicial approach marked by rules rather than discretion-conferring
standards).
7. See, e.g., id. at 1179–80.
8. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the concurring justices’ use of substantive due process to strike down the
Connecticut contraceptive statute “claim[s] for this Court and the federal judiciary power to
invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive”). Indeed,
in another major constitutional case from Justice Stevens’ last term, he and Justice Scalia dueled
over whether their respective due process methodologies appropriately cabined judicial
discretion. Compare McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) with id. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. But see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088, 3099–103 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining
how his approach to due process adjudication provides adequate limits on judicial discretion).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Cf. William D. Araiza, New Groups and Old Doctrine: Rethinking Congressional Power
to Enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 451, 492–93 (2010) (explaining
how other, competing understandings of equal protection might have led the clause to be read in
more determinate ways).
12. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
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abridging the freedom of speech”13 similarly fails to provide
determinate answers. The most ardent textualist application of the
First Amendment—Justice Black’s insistence that “no law means no
law”14—ultimately collided with the reality that some limits on the
freedom of speech were necessary to the government’s basic
operations15 and, indeed, to the nation’s survival.16
The vagueness of these commands has led the Court to adopt
mediating rules to decide cases. Such rules govern a case’s decision
but are not themselves of constitutional stature.17 Rather, they are
thought likely to yield the results that the underlying constitutional
command would require. Such mediating rules are adopted in
response to the epistemic difficulty courts face in applying the
underlying constitutional command. The clearest example of such a
rule is the tiered scrutiny structure of the equal protection doctrine as
originally enunciated in footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products.18 By presuming that non-discrete and insular groups not
suffering prejudice can generally use the political process to insure
against inappropriate singling out—and therefore subjecting
classifications burdening them to only rational basis scrutiny—
footnote four sought to replicate the results that an omniscient court
would reach after applying equal protection’s underlying command
that government treat individuals equally.19
The mediating nature of such rules—that is, their character as
imperfect reflections rather than direct instantiations of the
underlying constitutional command—implicates the rules-standards
debate. An important impetus for judges adopting mediating rules is
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (rejecting the claim that protesters had
a First Amendment right to speak on the grounds of a jailhouse); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding a state law restricting political speech near polling places as a
legitimate attempt to prevent voter intimidation).
16. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930) (announcing a strong presumption
against prior restraints, but suggesting their constitutionality in certain very limited
circumstances, such as those surrounding the publication of the sailing dates of troop ships in a
time of war).
17. The concept of mediating or decision rules has been widely discussed in legal
scholarship. For one explanation of such rules, see Mitchell Berman, Constitutional Decision
Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
18. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937).
19. See Araiza, supra note 11, at 481–82 (explaining the concept of mediating rules).
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that they feel themselves incapable of distilling a sufficiently precise
legal rule from the constitutional text itself. This concern might
reasonably lead a judge to embrace more rigid, concrete—and thus
judicially accessible—rules, as second-order rules of decision
capable of providing an answer to the case before her. By contrast,
Justice Stevens’ more contextual and nuance-rich approach appeals
to judges’ aspirations to apply the underlying constitutional
command directly, without reliance on such intervening rules. For
example, as Andrew Siegel labeled it, Justice Stevens’ equal
protection jurisprudence constituted equal protection “unmodified.”20
These observations provide several prisms through which we
can view Justice Stevens’ distinctive approach to equal protection
and the First Amendment. First, his approach requires us to consider
the usefulness of rigid rules in constraining judicial discretion.
Justice Souter memorably wrote that reviewing free speech cases
under “fairly strict categorical rules keeps the starch in the standards
for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting
what may be said.”21 Justice Scalia has made the same basic point
with regard to rigid rules more generally.22 Justice Stevens’ contrary
approach puts these claims to the test.
Second, Justice Stevens’ approach allows us to consider the
merits of a judicial method that decides cases based on direct
applications of vague constitutional text. Justice Stevens’ approach
to equal protection eschews standard tiered scrutiny analysis. His
well-known phrase “There is only one Equal Protection Clause”23
can be read as a direct attack not just on rigid doctrinal rules per se
but on their status as rules that mediate between the Constitution’s
underlying commands and judicial decisions in actual cases. His
approach to equal protection—and, to a lesser degree, the First
Amendment—aspires to decide cases based on principles that flow
directly from the text. It therefore allows us to consider whether such
unmediated constitutional review can satisfy basic judicial criteria of
objectivity, consistency, and predictability. Of special importance in
20. See Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the
Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339 (2006).
21. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring).
22. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 1178–79.
23. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).

Spring 2011]

THE LAW BEYOND THE RULES

895

the context of a Supreme Court justice, Justice Stevens’ approach
also allows us to consider whether this method gives adequate
guidance to lower court judges.
Finally, the contrast between the Court’s approach to equal
protection and First Amendment issues and Justice Stevens’
approach allows us to consider the role of humility in judging. Do
rigid, mediating rules really reflect judicial humility in the face of
epistemic uncertainty and judges’ all-too-human temptation to vote
their preferences when confronted with vaguely worded
constitutional commands? Or do such rules break down and create an
even worse situation: courts pretending to apply rigid, neutral rules
but actually voting their preferences sub silentio?24 Does Justice
Stevens’ approach reflect authentic judging—that is, a careful
weighing of facts and context against a legal rule that in many cases
cannot be stated with precision? Or does it cause constitutional law
to become completely unpredictable, since judges tasked with
applying this method would likely decide the same case differently,
based on subtle differences in how they perceive the facts and
context to relate to the general principle governing the case?25
This Article considers Justice Stevens’ constitutional
jurisprudence through the prism of his skepticism about mediating
standards. It will focus on his opinions in equal protection and free
speech cases—subjects in which the vagueness of the constitutional
text is especially pronounced and in which mediating doctrinal tests
are therefore both especially important and, to Justice Stevens,
especially likely to lead the Court into misapplying the relevant
constitutional command. Part I considers Justice Stevens’ approach
to mediating doctrines in equal protection and free speech.
Part II considers two First Amendment cases decided during the
October 2009 term—Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project26—that speak
to the question of mediating standards. Justice Stevens wrote
separately in only one of these cases—his now-famous dissent in
Citizens United. However, his decision to break with the liberal bloc
24. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088, 3118 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing Justice Scalia’s due process approach as lacking transparency).
25. Cf. Siegel, supra note 20, at 2341 (suggesting this risk from Justice Stevens’ approach to
equal protection law).
26. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
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and join Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Humanitarian
Law Project reflects his approach in Citizens United, by evincing an
aversion to rigid rules and an adherence to underlying constitutional
principles that necessarily require more fine-grained and contextual
analysis.
Part III evaluates the legacy of Justice Stevens’ adherence to
such contextual analysis. It considers the advantages of Justice
Stevens’ approach. It then considers the other side of the ledger, in
particular, the question whether rigid rules constrain judicial
discretion. Part III expresses doubt that these rules really do succeed
in constraining judicial discretion, at least in the hardest of cases.
Thus, while Justice Stevens’ approach is surely subject to fair
criticism, it is not at all clear that the alternative approach offered by
the Court better performs the tasks we ask of a court of final resort.
I. JUSTICE STEVENS AND UNMEDIATED
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
This part examines how Justice Stevens’ equal protection and
free speech jurisprudence eschewed mediating rules in favor of more
direct investigation of constitutional meaning. It illustrates his
skepticism of such rules and considers both his own approach and
the challenges that his approach raises.
A. Equal Protection
As is well known, modern equal protection doctrine relies
heavily on the three-tiered scrutiny structure ultimately grounded in
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products27 and worked out
more fully in the 1960s and 1970s. Justice Stevens repeatedly
expressed his dissatisfaction with this structure. In its place, he
analyzed equal protection claims by considering whether the
challenged law reflected impartial governance by the sovereign.28 As
explained below, his equal protection methodology has roots in
antebellum thinking about equality.29 More importantly for our
purposes, his approach aspires to decide cases by reference to the

27. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
28. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180–81 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment).
29. See infra text accompanying note 73.
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direct meaning of the equal protection clause rather than through the
mediating rules of Carolene’s tiered scrutiny structure. However, this
aspiration comes at a cost. As illustrated below, Justice Stevens’
methodology requires a judge to make highly contextualized
decisions that arguably give her a significant degree of discretion and
risk thus creating unpredictability in the law.
1. Rational Basis Review
Most fundamentally, Justice Stevens has expressed discomfort
with the rational basis standard that, under standard black-letter law,
constitutes the default for equal protection analysis. Justice Stevens
wrote a number of separate opinions—often joined by no other
justice—critiquing the majority’s application of rational basis
review.30 Most importantly, Justice Stevens criticized the
presumptions and other analytical tools that comprise standard
rational basis review. Consider U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz.31 In that case a seven-justice majority (including Justice
Stevens) upheld a federal32 statute that altered the retirement benefits
of different classes of railroad employees, and that separated the
employees into classes for purposes of eligibility for those benefits
based in part on the length and recency of their railroad service.
While Justice Stevens agreed with the majority’s result, he wrote
separately to express his sharp disagreement with its approach to
rational basis review. Then–Justice Rehnquist’s analysis for six
justices applied an exceptionally deferential version of rational basis
review. Most notably, the majority concluded that “the plain
language of [the statute] mark[ed] the beginning and end[ing]” of its
inquiry into statutory purpose.33 Justice Stevens, agreeing with
Justice Brennan’s dissent, criticized this approach. He made the
30. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 28–41 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); FCC v.
Beach Comm’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 320–23 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring); G.D. Searle & Co.
v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 420–21 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 477–89 (1981); see also W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 674 (1981) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
32. Because it was a federal action, technically the claim was of a violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause, which has been interpreted to include the same restrictions on
unequal treatment as the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. See, e.g., Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (striking down race segregation in federally operated schools as
violating the equality requirement inherent in the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause).
33. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176.
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obvious point that discerning the statute’s purpose from the text of its
operative provisions converted equal protection review into a
tautology, whereby a reviewing court could always conclude that the
legislature intended to do exactly what it did, thus creating a perfect
fit between the statute and its “purpose.”34 Rejecting this method of
review entailed rejecting the logical conclusion of standard rational
basis doctrine since that doctrine allows the court to hypothesize any
legitimate purpose for purposes of performing the “fit” portion of the
test. Such hypothesizing presumably authorizes the reviewing court
to hypothesize the purpose that fits most closely with the
classification—that the legislature set out to do exactly what the
statute did.35
Despite his disagreement with the majority’s methodology,
Justice Stevens nevertheless agreed that the classification was
constitutional. He did not adopt Justice Brennan’s argument that the
Court should determine the actual purpose that Congress had in
altering railroad workers’ retirement benefits and then test the
classification against that purpose. Justice Stevens observed that
inquiries into actual legislative purpose are hazardous as empirical
matters. He also noted the practical problem that a purpose inquiry
“may result in identically worded statutes being held valid in one
State and invalid in a neighboring State.”36 Instead, Justice Stevens
offered the following approach to deciding the issue:
I therefore believe that we must discover a correlation
between the classification and either the actual purpose of
the statute or a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably
presume to have motivated an impartial legislature. If the
adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of
34. See id. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 182, 186–87 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
35. To be sure, Justices Stevens and Brennan’s criticism of the majority is at least slightly
unfair. The majority’s allegedly circular approach to legislative purpose still requires that the
purpose indicated by the statutory classification have been achieved in a legitimate way. For
example, the Fritz Court, “beginning and end[ing],” id. at 176, with the statute’s “plain
language,” understood Congress’s purpose to have been phasing out “windfall” retirement
benefits for certain classes of employees. But immediately upon concluding that that was the
purpose, the Court then considered “whether Congress achieved its purpose in a patently arbitrary
or irrational way.” Id. at 177. This requirement, at least in theory, acts as an external check on
what would otherwise be the complete circularity of defining the legislature’s purpose by
examining what the legislature actually did.
36. Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect. If,
however, the adverse impact may reasonably be viewed as
an acceptable cost of achieving a larger goal, an impartial
lawmaker could rationally decide that the cost should be
incurred.37
It is not completely clear, at least from Fritz itself, whether
Justice Stevens’ approach realistically mitigates any circularity
concern. Recall that Justice Stevens called for an approach asking
whether there is “a correlation between the classification and either
the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate purpose that we may
reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature.”38
Leaving aside the actual purpose of a statute, how similar is a court’s
search for “a legitimate purpose that [it] may reasonably presume to
have motivated an impartial legislature” and a search, conducted as
part of standard rational basis review, for any hypothetical legitimate
purpose?39 Neither one has to be the actual purpose, but both have to
be legitimate. Is any analytical work done by the qualifier, “that we
may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature?”
Does Justice Stevens’ formulation imply a closer look at legislative
purpose, perhaps requiring that the purpose must have some closer
connection to the actual historical context in which the legislature
acted? We do not get the answer in Fritz because Justice Stevens
could rely on Congress’s actual legislative purpose, which he found
legitimate and closely enough connected to the statute’s
classifications to allow him to agree with the majority in upholding
the statute.
Part of the answer to this question can be found in Justice
Stevens’ classic dissent in Nordlinger v. Hahn.40 Nordlinger upheld
California’s Proposition 13 property tax scheme, which assessed
property values for taxation purposes based on the property’s
acquisition value. This scheme, as all members of the Court agreed,

37. Id. at 180–81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. Id. 181 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 76–77 (2001)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (contrasting heightened review from rational basis review by
explaining that the latter allows courts to hypothesize government interests supporting the
challenged classification).
40. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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led to wide variations in property tax liabilities for owners of
comparable properties, depending on when they were acquired.41
Despite this inequality, eight justices voted to uphold
Proposition 13 against an equal protection challenge. Justice
Blackmun wrote an opinion for seven justices employing traditional
rational basis review. He concluded that Proposition 13 was
rationally related to government interests in neighborhood stability
and in protecting what he called the “reliance interests” of owners
who purchased their properties before they had appreciated, carrying
with that appreciation a higher tax burden.42 Justice Thomas
concurred in part43 but argued that the Court’s analysis was
inconsistent with a case from three years earlier, Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County.44
Justice Stevens dissented alone, and his analysis revealed much
about his somewhat cryptic analysis in Fritz. Tellingly, he began his
opinion by describing the challenged law as “establish[ing] a
privilege of a medieval character.”45 This description calls to mind
the anti–class legislation tone implied by Justice Stevens’
understanding of equal protection as a fundamental requirement of
impartial governance.46
Moving beyond rhetoric, Justice Stevens explained his vision of
the equal protection clause. His explanation of what constitutes a
“legitimate” government interest reflected his early opinions’ focus
on impartiality. Repeating his analysis from Fritz, he explained that a
statute “must have a purpose or goal independent of the direct effect
of the legislation and one ‘that we may reasonably presume to have
motivated an impartial legislature.’”47 Importantly, he explained that
such a legitimate government interest “must encompass the interests
41. Id. at 6, 19, 29 (describing the unequal tax burdens carried by the plaintiff and her
neighbors, who owned comparable homes).
42. Id. at 17.
43. Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n.
of Webster Cnty., 488 U.S. 336 (1989). Allegheny Pittsburgh was a case in which the Court had
struck down an acquisition value tax scheme that had been imposed not by law, such as
Proposition 13, but by a county tax assessor in contravention of state law that mandated a market
value valuation approach.
45. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. See infra text accompanying note 73.
47. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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of members of the disadvantaged class and the community at large,
as well as the direct interests of the members of the favored class.”48
This description set up his critique of the Court’s rational basis
analysis of Proposition 13, which he characterized as “largely a
restatement of the benefits that accrue to long-time property
owners.”49 Thus, he criticized the majority’s acceptance of a
government interest in preserving long-standing property owners’
favorable tax treatment, which the majority had described as an
interest in protecting those owners’ “reliance interests,” as simply
restating Proposition 13’s effects.50 He concluded that the majority’s
analysis had not adequately demanded the sort of impartial
justification that equal protection required.51 Thus, Nordlinger adds
to the analysis the idea that, for Justice Stevens, a legitimate
government interest is one that does not simply benefit one class of
persons but can be understood as benefitting all. Dressing up purely
private gains in the language of legitimate protection of owners’
“reliance interests” will not do.
A further refinement of Justice Stevens’ approach can be found
in his short concurrence in FCC v. Beach Communications.52 In
Beach Communications, the Court unanimously upheld a provision
of federal communications law exempting private satellite TV
antennas from local government franchising requirements.53 Justice
Stevens agreed with that result but expressed skepticism about the
rationales embraced by the majority as part of its highly deferential
rational basis review.54 Instead, he concluded that “it is reasonable to
presume that Congress was motivated by an interest in allowing
property owners to exercise freedom in the use of their own

48. Id.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 38–41. He also criticized the majority’s acceptance of the state’s interest in
neighborhood stability as having too tenuous a fit with Proposition 13’s effects. See id. at 35–39.
52. 508 U.S. 307, 320 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
53. See id. at 313 (majority opinion).
54. Id. at 322, 322 nn.1–2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing doubt that the rationales
embraced by the majority were either the actual purposes motivating Congress or made logical
sense).
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property.”55 He then concluded that “[l]egislation so motivated surely
does not violate the sovereign’s duty to govern impartially.”56
In a footnote he appended to this discussion, he cited his
discussion in Fritz of his approach to equal protection issues.
Notably, he italicized the term “reasonably presume” in his formula
requiring “a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to
have motivated an impartial legislature.”57 His discussion of the
property rights rationale seems to have been a conscious illustration
of what he meant by that formula. This explanation is borne out by
the first paragraph of his concurring opinion:
Freedom is a blessing. Regulation is sometimes necessary,
but it is always burdensome. A decision not to regulate the
way in which an owner chooses to enjoy the benefits of an
improvement to his own property is adequately justified by
a presumption in favor of freedom.58
Justice Stevens then distinguished a property owner’s use of his own
property—here, to place a satellite television system—from his
decision to enter “an already regulated market”59—here, to sell
satellite television services to separately owned or managed
buildings. He concluded that
the presumption that an owner of property should be
allowed to use an improvement on his own property as he
sees fit unless there is a sufficient public interest in denying
him that right simply does not apply to the situation in
which the improvement—here, the satellite antenna—is
being used to distribute signals to subscribers on other
people’s property.60
Why not? Because, for Justice Stevens, the justification for nonregulation—the right to use one’s property as one wishes—dissipates
when one’s activities cross onto other people’s property. For Justice
Stevens, this difference justified the different regulatory treatment.
This rationale builds on Justice Stevens’ insistence in

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 323 n.3.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.
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Nordlinger that the statute’s purpose not be derived simply from the
statute’s effects. This implied that the statute’s purpose must be
external to the statute. In Beach Communications the presumption of
liberty to use one’s own property as one wished, a presumption that
pre-dated the statute, furnished the external standard against which
the classification could be tested.
So understood, Justice Stevens’ analysis recalled Justice
Jackson’s equal protection argument in Railway Express Agency v.
City of New York61 that the challenged ordinance’s classification
between truck owners who advertised their own businesses on their
trucks and owners who rented their truck panels for other businesses’
advertising was justified by what he called “the real difference
between doing something for self-interest and something for hire.”62
In both cases the difference distinguishing the burdened class from
the benefitted class was well established in preexisting law (the right
to use one’s property as one wishes, in Beach Communications, and
the additional burdens the law allowed to be imposed on hired
carriers, in Railway Express).63 Indeed, it is not coincidental that in
this same discussion Justice Jackson rejected an approach to equal
protection that allowed government to classify based on any
conceivable difference between the two classes.64
These cases make clear that Justice Stevens envisioned more
careful judicial review under equal protection than is suggested by
the traditional rational basis standard. More importantly, for our
purposes, they reveal dissatisfaction with the presumptions and
extreme hypothesizing allowed under that standard.65 Such
presumptions and hypothesizing are not direct instantiations of equal
protection’s core command to treat likes alike.66 Rather, they reflect
61. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
62. Id. at 116 (Jackson, J., concurring).
63. See id. at 116–17 (noting the differences in legal treatment courts had allowed based on
this distinction).
64. See id. at 115; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533 n.3 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Justice Jackson’s opinion for the proposition that government action cannot
be upheld simply by reference to “any conceivable” difference between the classes).
65. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. at 115 (Jackson, J., concurring) (critiquing the
proposition that classifications do not satisfy equal protection if they respond to “any
conceivable” differences between the two groups).
66. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539–48
(1982) (discussing the fundamental nature of the idea that equality consists of treating likes
alike).
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courts’ forthright recognition of their own inability to implement that
core command. By performing such deferential review when the
burdened group is presumed capable of fully participating in the
political process, courts assume that the likely result of that review—
a decision upholding the classification—reflects the likely result that
would have flowed from an omniscient court’s application of the
core command of equal treatment.
By contrast, Justice Stevens’ brand of “rationality”67 review
appears to aim for equal protection scrutiny unmediated by any such
tools of judicial review. By rejecting the tautological analysis the
majority embraced in Fritz, he expressed his insistence that judicial
review be more than a formality. By rejecting the Nordlinger
majority’s embrace of the property owners’ reliance justification for
Proposition 13, he took the next analytical step by defining a
legitimate government interest as an interest distinct from both the
text of the statute and its effects. Finally, by casting doubt on the
interests the Beach Communications majority embraced as sufficient
to uphold the statute and offering his alternative justification, he
aligned himself with Justice Jackson’s approach in Railway Express,
which searched for a justification that was both more than
hypothetical and external to the statute.
Each of these steps builds on the one before it. Together, they
paint a picture in which equal protection review insists on an interest
that is consistent with impartial government—not, for example, an
interest extracted either from the text68 or the effects69 of the
challenged statute itself. The review is still deferential. Note that
Justice Stevens rejected Justice Brennan’s call in Fritz that courts test
the statute against the actual legislative purpose.70 In addition, he
made it clear that the fit need not be perfect; in Beach
Communications, for example, he did not insist on perfect legislative
line-drawing with regard to those who enjoy exemption from
regulation.

67. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 2353.
68. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(critiquing what he called the majority’s tautological approach).
69. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 38–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s
embrace of the “reliance interest” justification for Proposition 13).
70. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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But the deference reflected in Justice Stevens’ approach is not
the abdication that traces its lineage back to Carolene Products.
Carolene Products–style deference is largely grounded in the Court’s
sense of its inability to review government line-drawing, and its
willingness to presume that the political process adequately takes
into account the interests and arguments of politically powerful
groups.71 By contrast, Justice Stevens’ deference rests on the
recognition that, in our system, legislatures have the authority to
make policy—which is what they do when they create classes at one
place rather than another. As long as such policymaking reflects
good faith, impartial government aiming at the public good—as
opposed to singling out groups for burdens and benefits simply for
the sake of helping one class and harming another—he would uphold
government classifications against equal protection challenges.72
In adopting this unmediated approach to equal protection, one
that aspires to defer to good faith classifications while performing
more than a formal exercise of judicial review, Justice Stevens
provided a faint echo of the class legislation concept that informed
American thinking about equality in the decades both immediately
before and after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.73
Embraced long before mediating principles such as those derived
from Carolene Products, this approach reflects one of the authentic
strands of equal protection doctrine. More importantly, for our
purposes, Justice Stevens’ echoing of that approach illustrated his
search for the real meaning of equal protection and for a theory of
judicial review that implements that understanding.
Admirable as it is, however, Justice Stevens’ approach raises its
own problems. His distinction between a court’s search for any
legitimate government interest it could hypothesize and an interest
that would motivate an impartial legislature is surely not self-evident.

71. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of
Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 532–41 (2005).
72. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A legitimate state interest must
encompass the interests of members of the disadvantaged class and the community at large, as
well as the direct interests of the members of the favored class.”).
73. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REV. 245, 251–68 (1997); Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex
Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1366, 1375 (1990) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988)).
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Consider the Nordlinger majority’s argument that Proposition 13
protected longtime property owners’ reliance interests. Presumably,
an argument could be made that protecting one class of owners’
reliance interests inured to the benefit of society more generally.
Perhaps protecting such interests encouraged others to invest in real
estate, or to emigrate to California. Surely those are interests that
might motivate an impartial legislature, even if the immediate
benefits of Proposition 13 were concentrated in the class of
“squires.”74 How, then, could Justice Stevens distinguish between
“illegitimate” favoritism for one class of persons and “legitimate”
benefitting of one class in the service of conferring more general
social benefits? Similarly, in Beach Communications his principle
presumptively favoring non-regulation is couched at such a high
level of generality that it comes close to being a makeweight.75 Given
these obvious questions, one might well ask whether Justice Stevens’
principles cabin judicial discretion to any degree at all.
2. Discriminatory Intent
One of the first important equal protection issues confronting
Justice Stevens after his elevation to the Court concerned whether
discriminatory intent was necessary to a finding of discrimination
reviewable under equal protection. Before 1976, the Court had issued
equivocal statements on the intent question. In the First Amendment
context, it had explicitly criticized reliance on legislative purpose as
sanctioning an inquiry into something fundamentally unknowable.76
In some race discrimination cases the Court had focused on the
effects of the challenged action. For example, in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,77 the Court struck down, as a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment, a decision by the City of Tuskegee, Alabama, to change
its municipal boundaries in a way that excluded almost all African
American residents while excluding no whites. While the Court was
not clear on the point, its rhetoric strongly suggested that it relied
74. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. It should be noted, however, that at least one commentator has suggested that the Court’s
most recent major statement on substantive due process embraces a similar presumption. See
generally Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas (Bos.
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 03-13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=
422564.
76. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383–84 (1968).
77. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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heavily on the challenged action’s effects.78 On the other hand, in
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,79 the Court
required the plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent in their
allegation of school segregation where segregation was not official
policy.
In 1976 the Court directly confronted the intent question.
Writing for a seven-justice majority in Washington v. Davis,80 Justice
White held that plaintiffs alleging equal protection claims had to
prove discriminatory intent—that is, purposeful government
discrimination on a ground (for example, race) that the plaintiff
alleged to be unconstitutional. This has since remained a
foundational rule of equal protection law.
While not as clear a mediating rule as Carolene Products’ tiered
scrutiny structure, the intent requirement nevertheless serves as a
gatekeeper, keeping the courts out of the business of scrutinizing
government action solely on the ground that it burdens a particular
group (for example, women) more heavily than another group.81
Indeed, the role it plays in keeping courts out of difficult policy
decisions is suggested by the last portion of Justice White’s opinion
in Davis, which explicitly noted the wide-ranging nature of judicial
inquiry that would follow from rejecting an intent requirement.82
Justice White’s explicit statement that, given the consequences of
rejecting an intent requirement,83 displacement of the requirement
“should await legislative prescription”84 further suggests the intent
78. See, e.g., id. at 347 (“[T]he inescapable human effect of [the city’s action] . . . is to
despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights.”).
79. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
80. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Justice Stewart joined the relevant part of the majority opinion. Id.
at 252. Justice Stevens indicated agreement with the “general rule” stated in the majority opinion.
Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. Id. at
256 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (applying the intent requirement to sex
discrimination claims).
82. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 (“A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race
more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.”).
83. See id.
84. Id. It is likely that the “legislative prescription” Justice White had in mind was federal
legislation enforcing the equal protection clause. The rest of the sentence quoted in the text
explicitly referenced “public employment” as an example of an area where Congress had in fact
done away with the intent requirement. Such legislation had already been upheld as appropriate
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requirement is a mediating rule and not a core requirement of equal
protection.
Compared to his colleagues, Justice Stevens has taken a much
less rigid approach to equal protection, even accounting for the fact
that since 1976 the full Court has also softened the requirement’s
hard edges.85 In Davis, Justice Stevens indicated agreement with “the
statement of the general rule in the Court’s opinion.”86 However, he
coupled this acceptance with a much more nuanced understanding of
the rule’s real-world impact:
The requirement of purposeful discrimination is a common
thread running through the cases [relied on by Justice
White] . . . Frequently, the most probative evidence of
intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind
of the actor . . . . This is particularly true in the case of
governmental action which is frequently the product of
compromise, of collective decision making, and of mixed
motivation . . . . My point . . . is to suggest that the line
between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact
is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as
the reader of the Court’s opinion might assume. I agree, of
course, that a constitutional issue does not arise every time
some disproportionate impact is shown. On the other hand,
when the disproportion is . . . dramatic . . . it really does not
matter whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose
or effect. Therefore, although I accept the statement of the
legislation enforcing the equal protection clause. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Moreover, any sense that Justice White had the commerce clause in mind as a source of authority
for such “legislative prescription” runs into the fact that National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), which severely limited congressional power under the commerce clause to
enforce federal labor law on states, was just two weeks away from being announced when Davis
was announced. Compare Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833 (decided June 24, 1976), with
Davis, 426 U.S. at 229 (decided June 7, 1976). Because Justice White’s seven-justice majority
included all five of the justices in the National League majority, it is most unlikely that they
would have understood Justice White’s reference to congressional power to dispense with the
intent requirement in the context of state labor relations as a reference to the interstate commerce
power those five justices were primed to limit in exactly that way.
85. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (concluding that the bizarre shape of a
congressional district may by itself be proof of the discriminatory intent underlying it); Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (recognizing that the
extent of a government action’s disparate impact is relevant to the intent determination).
86. Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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general rule in the Court’s opinion, I am not yet prepared to
indicate how that standard should be applied in the many
cases which have formulated the governing standard in
different language.87
As with his critique of rational basis review, here too Justice Stevens
aspired to cut through a mediating standard (here, the intent
requirement) to decide cases based on an interpretation of the actual
equal protection command. For Justice Stevens, intent was not itself
a constitutional requirement: “[W]hen the disproportion is . . .
dramatic . . . it really does not matter whether the standard is phrased
in terms of purpose or effect.”88
Later cases illustrated how Justice Stevens saw the intent rule as
an analytical tool rather than a constitutional requirement in itself.
For example, in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,89 the Court
applied Davis’ intent requirement to a case of sex discrimination.90
The Court concluded that a state civil service veteran’s preference
did not constitute sex discrimination because it was not enacted with
the requisite intent to classify against women.91 Justice Stevens’ very
short concurring opinion is reprinted in full here:
While I concur in the Court’s opinion, I confess that I am
not at all sure that there is any difference between the two
questions posed ante [whether the classification itself is
overtly or covertly gender-based, and, if not, whether the
adverse effects themselves reflect invidious discrimination].
If a classification is not overtly based on gender, I am
inclined to believe the question whether it is covertly
gender based is the same as the question whether its adverse
effects reflect invidious gender-based discrimination.
However the question is phrased, for me the answer is
largely provided by the fact that the number of males
disadvantaged by Massachusetts’ veterans’ preference
(1,867,000) is sufficiently large—and sufficiently close to
the number of disadvantaged females (2,954,000)—to

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 253–54.
Id.
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Id. at 274–80.
Id. at 279–81.
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refute the claim that the rule was intended to benefit males
as a class over females as a class.92
In one sense, Justice Stevens was simply restating good blackletter law from the follow-up case to Davis, in which the Court
identified the extent of the disparate impact as a factor in
determining discriminatory intent.93 However, his concurrence posed
much more starkly the question whether the concept of
discriminatory intent possesses any independent constitutional
relevance. In particular, his equation of a statute’s “covert” gender
basis with the question whether the discriminatory effects reflect
invidious sex discrimination suggests that he is boring past mediating
concepts such as intent into the core equal protection inquiry:
whether the government is engaging in invidious discrimination.
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority result in Feeney.94
Twelve years later, in Hernandez v. New York,95 the Court’s rigid
distinction between intent and effects led Justice Stevens to dissent.96
His dissenting opinion revealed more about his approach to the intent
issue, and to equal protection more generally. Hernandez considered
a criminal defendant’s claim, under Batson v. Kentucky,97 that the
prosecutor had engaged in discrimination against Latino jurors by
using his peremptory challenges to strike several Spanish-speaking
members of the venire.98 When challenged, the prosecutor argued
that the members he had struck had hesitated when asked whether
they could accept the translator’s translation of witness testimony
from Spanish to English.99
Following the procedural sequence set forth in Batson, the Court
first recognized that the defendant had made out a prima facie case of

92. Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(recognizing that the extent of a government action’s disparate impact is relevant to the intent
determination).
94. 442 U.S. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
96. Id. at 375–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
98. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355 (plurality opinion). While Batson mandates a specific
inquiry distinct from the standard equal protection intent structure, the two inquiries are closely
related. See, e.g., id. at 372–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring ) (explaining the connection between
these two inquiries).
99. Id. at 356.

Spring 2011]

THE LAW BEYOND THE RULES

911

discrimination—a point the state did not dispute.100 The Court,101
continuing to apply Batson, then concluded that the prosecutor had
offered “a race-neutral basis for [the] peremptory strikes”—his
concern about the prospective jurors’ willingness to accept the
translator’s version of the testimony.102 More specifically, a majority
found that the trial judge did not commit clear error when he
believed the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation.103 A four-justice
plurality then found that the state court did not err in concluding that
the prosecutor’s explanation was not simply a pretext.104 Based on
that conclusion, it rejected Hernandez’s claim.105
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed that
Hernandez’s claim was meritless (thus creating a majority for that
result).106 However, she employed an even more rigid intent
requirement.107 She argued that the case was over once the Court did
not reverse the trial judge’s finding that believed the prosecutor’s
race-neutral explanation.108 As she wrote at the end of her opinion,
“Batson does not require . . . that the [prosecutor’s] justification be
unrelated to race. Batson requires only that the prosecutor’s reason
for striking a juror not be the juror’s race.”109 In essence, then, she
found the plurality’s last step—its pretext examination—
unnecessary, because the prosecutor’s now-credited explanation was
not based on race, but only related to race.110
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.111 He
focused his objection on the Court’s willingness to accept the
prosecutor’s justification for striking the bilingual members of the
venire:
100. Id. at 359.
101. The Court majority in this case consisted of a plurality opinion of four justices, written
by Justice Kennedy, and a concurrence in the judgment written by Justice O’Connor and joined
by Justice Scalia.
102. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361 (plurality opinion); id. at 372, 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) (agreeing with this conclusion).
103. Id. at 369–70 (plurality opinion); id. at 372 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. Id. at 369–70 (plurality opinion).
105. Id. at 372.
106. Id. at 372–75 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 375.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 375–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Court mistakenly believes that it is compelled to reach
this result because an equal protection violation requires
discriminatory purpose. . . . The Court overlooks, however,
the fact that the “discriminatory purpose” which
characterizes violations of the Equal Protection Clause can
sometimes be established by objective evidence that is
consistent with a decisionmaker’s honest belief that his
motive was entirely benign. “Frequently the most probative
evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what
actually happened,” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253
(Stevens, J., concurring), including evidence of disparate
impact.112
Justice Stevens assumed that the prosecutor’s explanation “was
advanced in good faith.”113 Nevertheless, he concluded that it failed
to overcome Hernandez’s prima facie case.114 He offered three
reasons for this conclusion.115 First, he argued that acceptance of the
prosecutor’s explanation “would inevitably result in a
disproportionate
disqualification
of
Spanish-speaking
venirepersons.”116 Second, he argued that “the prosecutor’s concern
could easily have been accommodated by less drastic means.”117
Third, he concluded that “if the prosecutor’s concern was valid and
substantiated by the record, it would have supported a challenge for
cause.”118
Two points bear noting. First, the disparate effects that resulted
from the prosecutor’s explanation helped convince Justice Stevens
that that explanation “was insufficient to dispel the existing inference
of racial animus”119 raised by Hernandez’s prima facie case. Second,
the second and third reasons collapsed equal protection’s standard
“fit” analysis into the intent inquiry. Both of these points reveal a
discomfort with step-by-step equal protection analysis, and a
112. Id. at 377.
113. Id. at 379.
114. Id. at 378–79.
115. Id. at 379.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Justice Stevens conceded that none of these justifications, standing alone, might have
sufficed to defeat the prosecutor’s explanation. See id.
119. Id.
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preference for considering all of those steps—most importantly, the
intent inquiry and the resulting level of scrutiny—as part of a holistic
analysis asking whether government has advanced merely a
“frivolous or illegitimate”120 justification for a pattern of
discriminatory behavior. Consider the steps in a standard equal
protection case. First, the plaintiff must prove some disparate impact
from the government action.121 Second, the plaintiff must show that
the alleged intent (e.g., to classify based on race) made up at least
some of the government’s motivation.122 Third, the government can
rebut the plaintiff’s case by proving that it would have made the
same decision even had it lacked that alleged intent.123 Finally, if
intent is proven, the court applies the appropriate level of scrutiny.124
By contrast, Justice Stevens’ approach in Hernandez collapsed
all of those steps into one holistic inquiry—into disparate impact,
intent, and narrow tailoring.125 Given this preference for holistic
review, it is not surprising that in Hernandez Justice Stevens
criticized the Court for focusing on the trees, thus missing the forest:
“The Court . . . errs in focusing the entire inquiry on the subjective
state of mind of the prosecutor.”126 For Justice Stevens, such an
inquiry—indeed, the entire inquiry into intent—became a distraction
for the Hernandez Court: relevant, but merely evidentiary of the
ultimate equal protection question.127 Of course, sequential burden
shifting of the sort mandated by Batson (and the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence more generally)128 is inherently mediating.
Rather than an inquiry into ultimate constitutional meaning, it is,
literally, a litigation mechanism. But that is why Justice Stevens
attempted to cut through the rigidity of such burden-shifting rules to

120. Id. at 377.
121. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–26 (1971).
122. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).
123. Id. at 270 n.21.
124. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492–97 (1974) (concluding that a state
employee health insurance plan not covering pregnancy health care did not discriminate against
women, and thus applying only rational basis scrutiny to the plan).
125. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 378.
127. Id.
128. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–68 (setting forth the steps in equal
protection review); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352, 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
similarities between the Batson inquiry and equal protection scrutiny more generally).
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ask a (relatively) straightforward question: Once the plaintiff has
come forward with evidence that the government has acted in a way
that affects one group differently than another, has the government
provided an explanation that might “have motivated an impartial
legislature”129 and that was not unlikely, given the actual historical
evidence?130
Thus, for Justice Stevens, the intent requirement, to the extent it
has been understood as mandating an intermediate inquiry into a
decision maker’s subjective motivation, has distracted the Court’s
attention from the fundamental equal protection question. In his
view, the intent rule, while a potentially useful tool, has hardened
into a rigid doctrinal hurdle that has often hindered, rather than
assisted, the Court’s attempt to give meaning to equal protection’s
vague, though majestic, command.131
3. Heightened Scrutiny
It is the Court’s use of heightened scrutiny that has occasioned
the best-known expressions of Justice Stevens’ dissatisfaction with
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice Stevens
stated his famous (and succinct) critique of tiered scrutiny—“There
is only one Equal Protection Clause”132—exclusively in cases where
the Court applied some level of heightened scrutiny.133 In City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center134 he elaborated on his critique

129. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
130. Cf. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment) (casting doubt on the empirical likelihood of the justifications embraced by the
Court for the classification).
131. Cf. James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation
of Justice Stevens’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2302 (“Stevens
is worried that the Court is forgetting the Constitution and indulging the lawyerly yen to develop
a complex doctrinal framework.”).
132. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242–64 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511–18 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744–65
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–14 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). This fact is unsurprising, since Justice Stevens’ preferred method of equal protection
review—an inquiry into the rationality of the legislature’s classification decision—is at least
linguistically consistent with the Court’s rational basis standard, even if in practice it is quite
different; see also supra Part I.A.3 (discussing these differences).
134. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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of heightened scrutiny.135 In Cleburne Justice Stevens agreed with the
Court in striking down a city’s denial of a permit to an organization
seeking to establish a group home for mentally retarded persons.136
However, he rejected the majority’s approach that first determined
whether the mentally retarded were a suspect class, and then, after
concluding that they were not, applied ostensibly rational basis
scrutiny.137 Instead, he offered this critique and alternative approach:
I have never been persuaded that [the traditional threetiered scrutiny structure] adequately explain[s] the [Court’s]
decisional process. . . .
I am inclined to believe that what has become known
as the [tiered] analysis of equal protection claims does not
describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but
rather is a method the Court has employed to explain
decisions that actually apply a single standard in a
reasonably consistent fashion. . . . In my own approach to
these cases, I have always asked myself whether I could
find a “rational basis” for the classification at issue. The
term “rational,” of course, includes a requirement that an
impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged
class. Thus, the word “rational”—for me at least—includes
elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always
characterize the performance of the sovereign’s duty to
govern impartially.138
Clearly, in this passage Justice Stevens was tying his review of
“suspect” classifications to the general theory of equal protection
review he sketched out in Fritz.139 This is unsurprising: since he
consistently argued that “there is only one Equal Protection Clause,”
it makes perfect sense that he would attempt to apply the same
135. Id. at 451–55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
136. Id.at 454–55.
137. Id. 451–54. The majority’s deviation from traditional rational basis analysis is well
known. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 71, at 539–41 (describing the majority’s approach and noting
its deviation from traditional rational basis review principles).
138. Id. at 451–52 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted) (first internal quotation marks
omitted).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 31, 34, 41–42, 51, 62, 64.
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scrutiny to all classifications—“suspect” or otherwise. The
interesting question is how his style of self-described rationality
review played out in cases considering classifications the Court’s
majority called “suspect,” and to which it applied heightened
scrutiny.
An interesting initial observation is that Justice Stevens’ votes in
such cases are, at least at first blush, the least predictable of the
justices’ votes. For example, while liberal justices have consistently
voted to strike down sex classifications and uphold race-based
affirmative action plans, and conservative justices have consistently
voted in the opposite way,140 Justice Stevens has voted both ways. In
considering race-based affirmative action, he has issued stinging
critiques,141 measured criticism,142 and a welcoming embrace.143 In
considering sex discrimination claims, Justice Stevens has usually
voted to strike down sex classifications but has at times deserted his

140. Of course, the idea of “consistency” needs to be approached with care. First, it is an
overstatement to say that liberal and conservative justices always vote in the ways described in
the text. For example, in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), Justice Kennedy and
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined with the Court’s liberals to vote to strike down Virginia Military
Institute’s sex-discriminatory policy, although it should be noted that the chief justice did so via a
separate, narrower opinion. Id. at 558–66. Moreover, the chief justice wrote the majority opinion
in Nevada Deptartment of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), upholding the
Family and Medical Leave Act as appropriate legislation enforcing the sex equality guarantee of
the equal protection clause. Second, “liberal” and “conservative” are themselves terms that are
perhaps too imprecise to describe precisely the justices’ views on sex equality. Most notably,
Justice O’Connor, who was usually viewed as a member of the Court’s conservative bloc, or at
most a swing justice, was among the Court’s staunchest advocates of a broad reading of the
clause’s sex equality guarantee. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982) (concluding, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, that equal protection required that laws
discriminating on the basis of sex had to show an “exceedingly persuasive justification”); Nguyen
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court’s decision to uphold a statutory preference for the foreign-born children of Americancitizen mothers over foreign-born children of American-citizen fathers as inconsistent with the
Court’s sex equality precedents). Third, and perhaps most importantly, cases that reach the
Supreme Court are usually the hardest cases; thus, some division of opinion on the Court is to be
expected, and does not necessarily indicate simple dogmatism.
141. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(comparing race-based set-aside law to Nazi racial purity laws).
142. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511–12 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that racial set-asides may be
appropriate in certain circumstances but not when inadequately justified and over-broad).
143. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a lay-off priority rule preferential to minority teachers was adequately justified by a concern
that students have racially diverse role models).
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liberal colleagues to vote to uphold them.144 These results suggest
that he was applying a more context-specific approach to these
issues—not surprisingly, given his rejection of across-the-board
“heightened” scrutiny for entire types of classifications.
Justice Stevens’ approach to race-based set-asides is instructive.
His first major opinion on this topic, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,145 avoided the constitutional issue by resting on
his interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.146 His
first major discussion of the constitutional issue came two years later
in Fullilove v. Klutnick.147 Tellingly, he began his opinion with the
same sort of language about monopoly privileges that ran through his
dissent in Nordlinger.148 He then criticized the set-aside law for
drawing blunt, purely race-based distinctions without any
explanation as to why those distinctions were necessary.149
As strident as his criticism was—even to the point of suggesting
that the government consult the Nazi race laws for guidance on how
to draw the classifications created in the statute150—Justice Stevens
was careful to note that he was not announcing a per se rule against
governmental use of race.151 He began his detailed analysis of the
justifications for the law with the statement that “racial
144. Compare, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (writing for the majority, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and rejecting equal protection challenge to federal immigration law
granting preference to foreign-born children of American-citizen mothers over foreign-born
children of American-citizen fathers), with id. at 460–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and id. at
471–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting); compare Nguyen, 553 U.S. 53 (joining Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion rejecting the equal protection claim the Court did not resolve on the merits in
Miller), with id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer); compare Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (writing for the majority
and rejecting equal protection and due process arguments that father of illegitimate child who has
not established a relationship with his child should have the power to veto adoption of the child),
with id. at 268–76 (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court on the due process issue,
and thus not reaching the equal protection question).
145. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
146. Id. at 408–21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
148. Compare id. at 533 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the statute as conferring
“monopoly privileges” on the basis of characteristics acquired at birth), with Nordlinger v. Hahn,
505 U.S. 1, 29 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the beneficiaries of Proposition 13 as
“squires”).
149. 448 U.S. at 533–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 534 n.5.
151. See id. at 548 (“Unlike Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, however, I am not
convinced that the Clause contains an absolute prohibition against any statutory classification
based on race.”).
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characteristics may serve to define a group of persons who have
suffered a special wrong and who, therefore, are entitled to special
reparations.”152 However, his analysis of the set-aside program led
him to conclude that its delineation of beneficiaries was too
approximate, in light of the program’s justifications, to justify the use
of race as a classifying tool.153 In his review of the statute he focused
not just on his own estimation of the poor fit between the program’s
use of race and any legitimate government interest but also on
Congress’s failure to demonstrate that race was in fact an appropriate
classification tool in this context.154 In examining Congress’s actions
in this way, he explicitly referred to and relied on the then-current
notion of “due process of lawmaking,”155 which he himself had
embraced in an earlier opinion for the Court.156
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Fullilove provides a prism through
which we can view his subsequent opinions on racial set-asides and
helps explain his otherwise seemingly inconsistent votes. First, his
concern with the poor fit between the Fullilove statute’s race
classification and the government’s justifications explains his
concurrence in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,157 in which he
agreed with the Court that Richmond’s race-based set-aside program
was insufficiently precisely drawn, both in terms of its beneficiaries
and the parties it burdened.158 But it also helps explain his otherwisesurprising defense of the federal contracting set-aside in Adarand

152. Id. at 537.
153. See id. at 537–48. Justice Stevens also rejected, as “plainly impermissible,” a
government interest in using race as a tool to ensure benefits to legislators’ constituents. See id. at
541–42.
154. See, e.g., id. at 538 (noting the lack of legislative history that each racially defined class
of beneficiaries was equally entitled to “reparations” from the federal government); id. at 545
(“Unless Congress clearly articulates the need and basis for a racial classification, and also tailors
the classification to its justification, the Court should not uphold this kind of statute.”); id. at 548–
54 (generally critiquing Congress’s failure to deliberate carefully about the need for using a racial
classification).
155. See id. at 549 n.24 (citing and quoting Hans Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB.
L. REV. 197, 255 (1976)).
156. See id. at 548 n.23 (quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105 (1976)
(concluding, in a majority opinion by Justice Stevens, that it was “appropriate to review the
extent to which the [challenged administrative] policy has been given consideration by Congress
or the President . . . .”)).
157. 448 U.S. 469 (1989).
158. See id. at 514–16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Constructors v. Pena.159 While he contended that the result in
Fullilove should have led the Court to uphold the federal set-aside,160
he also argued that the statute should have survived even under the
views he expressed in his dissenting opinion.161 On this latter point he
noted that the set-aside challenged in Adarand made race neither “the
sole criterion of eligibility,”162 nor a “sufficient qualification.”163
Instead, he understood the statute challenged in Adarand as
“designed to overcome the social and economic disadvantages that
are often associated with racial characteristics.”164
Justice Stevens’ concern in Fullilove with the poor fit between
the set-aside’s racial classification and the government’s remedial
objectives influenced his subsequent thinking about affirmative
action in a second way. In Croson, Justice Stevens took an even
stronger position than the Court against race-based legislative action
designed to achieve a remedial goal.165 He based his position on a
conviction that legislative action was likely to be a poor fit for a goal
of both providing a remedy to the victims of discrimination and
forcing wrongdoers to change their conduct.166 On this point, he drew
a sharp distinction between legislative and judicial action, arguing
that the latter was more likely to reflect an appropriately fine-tuned
action.167
159. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
160. Id. at 259 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 259–64.
162. Id. at 259.
163. Id. at 260.
164. Id. at 261. Further to this point, he observed that the scheme challenged in Adarand,
unlike the one challenged in Fullilove, targeted subcontracts between private firms, which he
described as more likely to be based on social relationships, and thus more likely to reflect social
segregation. Id. By contrast, he observed that the prime, government-let contracts targeted by the
Fullilove statute should be largely free of such taint. See id. (“The 1977 Act [challenged in
Fullilove] applied entirely to the award of public contracts, an area of the economy in which
social relationships should be irrelevant and in which proper supervision of government
contracting officers should preclude any discrimination against particular bidders on account of
their race.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 172–76 (discussing Justice Stevens’ reliance
on the contracting-subcontracting distinction).
165. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 n.1 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my view the Court’s approach to this case
gives unwarranted deference to race-based legislative action that purports to serve a purely
remedial goal”).
166. See id. at 511 n.1.
167. See id. (“Unless the legislature can identify both the particular victims and the particular
perpetrators of past discrimination, which is precisely what a court does when it makes findings
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This distinction explains Justice Stevens’ otherwise surprising,
broad validation of race-based judicial action imposed to remedy
past discrimination in United States v. Paradise.168 In that case,
Justice Stevens based his analysis almost exclusively on Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,169 the seminal case in
which the Court upheld broad judicial power to order desegregative
remedies in response to proven constitutional violations,170 citing
previous racial set-aside cases only to explain why they were
inapposite as precedents.171
Indeed, Justice Stevens’ disfavoring of legislative remedial
action helps explain his analytical approach in Adarand. At first
blush, the set-aside challenged in Adarand would seem to fall on the
wrong side of the line Justice Stevens drew between remedial action
taken by a legislature and analogous action taken by a court.
However, Justice Stevens argued in Adarand that the challenged setaside, “if in part a remedy for past discrimination, is most
importantly a forward-looking response to practical problems faced
by minority subcontractors.”172 As support for this proposition he
relied heavily on the distinction between the Fullilove statute’s focus
on set-asides for contractors dealing directly with the government
and the Adarand statute’s focus on subcontractors dealing with
contractors.173 Justice Stevens understood the Adarand statute to
focus more closely than the Fullilove statute on ameliorating the
problem of minority entrepreneurs not enjoying the informal

of fact and conclusions of law, a remedial justification for race-based legislation will almost
certainly sweep too broadly.”).
168. 480 U.S. 149, 189–95 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. 402 U.S 1 (1971).
170. Of the seventeen paragraphs in Justice Stevens’ Paradise concurrence, nine consisted of
paragraph-long quotations from Swann. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 190–94 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
171. See id. at 193 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)). Cf. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 166 n.17 (plurality opinion) (citing
Wygant, Bakke, and Fullilove as authority for the standard of review appropriate to be applied in
Paradise itself); id. at 187 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Fullilove as authority for the
standard of review); id. at 196, 199 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Wygant and Fullilove as
authority for the standard of review).
172. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 261–62 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
173. See id. at 261.
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connections with established white-owned firms.174 He thus
concluded that the goal of encouraging contractors to go beyond their
existing list of social and business contacts and to work with new
subcontractors constituted not just “a remedy for past
discrimination”175 but “most importantly a forward-looking response
to practical problems faced by minority contractors.”176
One may reasonably wonder if the contractor-subcontractor
distinction can bear the weight Justice Stevens placed on it, as
relevant not just to the fit issue but also to the question of the nature
of the government interests underlying the program. Regardless of
one’s views on that question, the larger point remains: Justice
Stevens took great care to consider the particular government interest
offered to justify the race-based action. In particular, he
distinguished sharply between legislative uses of race designed to
remedy past discrimination and legislative uses of race justified on
other (especially future-oriented) grounds.177 He did not do so simply
as a reference point for a one-size-fits-all strict scrutiny review.
While he consistently expressed concern about race-based
classifications,178 the different reception he accorded to the racebased actions in Fullilove, Paradise, Croson, and Adarand suggest a
much more context-specific approach to his scrutiny of government
use of race.
Two final examples reinforce this point. In Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,179 Justice Stevens dissented from the Court’s
decision striking down a school district’s teacher-layoff plan that
gave some measure of protection to minority teachers, even if that
174. Id. By contrast, he saw the government-contractor preference in Fullilove as acting in a
situation—the relationship between contractors and the federal government—“in which social
relationships should be irrelevant and in which proper supervision of government contracting
officers should preclude any discrimination against particular bidders on account of their race.”
Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 261–62.
177. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“Today the Court squarely rejects the proposition that a governmental decision that rests on a
racial classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong. I endorse this focus
on the future benefit, rather that the remedial justification, of such decisions.”) (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted).
178. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 319–20 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“We should not lightly approve the government’s use of a race-based distinction.
History teaches the obvious dangers of such classifications.”).
179. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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meant overruling the results that would have obtained from applying
the district’s normal, seniority-based layoff plan.180 Justice Stevens
began his opinion with a straightforward statement that rather than
relying on a retrospective goal of remedying past discrimination, the
government’s use of race should have first been tested against its
future-regarding interest in educating children by providing them
with role models of all races.181 He called this goal “quite obvious,”182
“completely sound,”183 “rational and unquestionably legitimate,”184
and “a valid public purpose.”185 However, he never called it
“compelling,” as one might have expected had he been performing
traditional strict scrutiny review186—or indeed, if one had just read
his Fullilove comparison of federal race set-aside contracting laws to
the Nuremburg Laws.187 Strikingly, he analogized the harm the white
teachers suffered through this race-based layoff scheme to the harm
teachers might suffer if the district protected from layoffs their
colleagues who specialized in subjects that were in short supply,188
thereby clearly suggesting, in this context, a constitutional
equivalence between layoffs based on race and layoffs based on
subject-matter expertise.
Second, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,189 Justice Stevens joined
the five-justice majority upholding the FCC’s preferences for
minority owners of radio or broadcast television stations. He also
wrote a brief separate concurrence190 that set forth his views on this
issue. Most importantly for our purposes, his concurrence
“endorse[d] [the Court’s] focus on the future benefit, rather than the

180. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 315.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 315–16.
185. Id. at 320.
186. Cf. id. at 274, 278 (majority opinion) (using the word “compelling” to describe the
interest that the government needs to have shown was furthered); id. at 285, 286, 288, 292
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (same); id. at 296 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting the “compelling factual setting in which this case evidently has arisen”).
187. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
190. Id. at 601–02 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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remedial justifications,” of government use of race.191 He found the
government’s interest in broadcast diversity “unquestionably
legitimate,”192 and he compared it to other interests that he considered
sufficient to justify government use of race: the interest in an
“integrated police force” that he discussed in Wygant,193 “diversity in
the composition of a public school faculty—the subject of Wygant, in
which he voted to uphold the government action,194 or “diversity in
the student body of a professional school,” the issue in Bakke.”195
Here, too, as in Wygant, the government interest was important not
simply as a reference point for the strict scrutiny inquiry, but also as
meaningful support for the constitutionality of the government action
considered against equal protection’s core, unmediated command
that government act only to further legitimate public interests.
In sum, then, the relatively more relaxed—though still
vigilant196—review Justice Stevens performed in Wygant and
(implicitly) in Metro Broadcasting stands in sharp contrast to his
skepticism about race-based legislative action based on a remedial
rationale.197 It suggests that, for Justice Stevens, the government
interest was much more than an input into a formal scrutiny standard.
Rather, for him, the interest stood on its own as either inherently
unlikely to provide a sufficiently tight fit with government use of
race as a classifying tool or as an interest that justified any
reasonable government use of race.198
This approach corresponds to what is probably most widely
known about Justice Stevens’ race jurisprudence: his willingness to
191. Id. at 601.
192. Id.
193. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 313–20.
195. Here, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc., Justice Stevens cited Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 n.6 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring),
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
196. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 319–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We should not lightly
approve the government’s use of a race-based distinction. History teaches the obvious dangers of
such classifications.”).
197. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 n.1 (1989).
198. E.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 261–62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given [the difficulties
minority subcontractors might have in establishing informal connections with contracting firms],
Congress could reasonably find that a minority subcontractor is less likely to receive favors from
the entrenched businesspersons who award subcontracts only to people with whom . . . they have
an existing relationship. This program, then, . . . is most importantly a forward-looking response
to practical problems faced by minority subcontractors.”).
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distinguish between benign and invidious race classifications without
the use of mediating tools such as strict scrutiny.199 This
willingness—indeed, the obligation—to engage in such an inquiry
follows naturally from Justice Stevens’ insistence that courts apply a
single “reasonableness” standard to equal protection claims.200 Such a
unitary standard, unmediated by a particular tier of review, requires a
judge to make explicitly substantive judgments about the
invidiousness of classifications, as opposed to reaching such
judgments as a conclusion to be drawn from the outcome of a
particular level of tiered review.201 This difference between the
Court’s standard approach to equal protection and Justice Stevens’
approach is hidden in the rational basis cases, since both approaches
ostensibly ask the same question—whether the classification is
rational.202 However, it is unmasked—“smoked out,”203 if you will—
in cases in which the Court employs heightened scrutiny. Ultimately,
since Justice Stevens argued that there is one equal protection
standard—rationality—he had to consider whether particular uses of
race in the affirmative action cases were reasonable on their own
merits, rather than separating the wheat from the chaff via the tool of
strict scrutiny. In other words, he had to determine whether a
199. Compare, e.g., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493 (“Absent searching judicial inquiry into
the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict
scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”), with Adarand, 515
U.S. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The consistency that the Court espouses [by requiring strict
scrutiny of all government uses of race] would disregard the difference between a ‘No
Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”).
200. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 452 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Thus, the word ‘rational’—for me at least—includes elements of legitimacy and
neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign’s duty to govern
impartially.”).
201. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 131, at 2302 (“Stevens is admonishing that in elaborating
complex doctrinal frameworks, the Supreme Court should not lose sight of its obligation to make
normative judgments about the meaning of our constitutional commitments.”). But see J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493 (“Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant
use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling goal
so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate
racial prejudice or stereotype.”).
202. Of course, the way the two approaches get to that conclusion is quite different, as
explained earlier in this Article, supra text accompanying notes 30–75.
203. See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493.
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particular use of race in fact constituted a “No Trespassing” sign or a
welcome mat.204
This is no mean feat. In the race context, Justice Stevens himself
recognized the price that affirmative action beneficiaries pay in terms
of stigma.205 When pressed on this point by Justice Thomas in
Adarand, Justice Stevens was forced into conclusory assertions about
the extent of stigma created by particular affirmative action
programs.206 In his defense, surely there is much common sense in
his refusal “to equate the many well-meaning and intelligent
lawmakers and their constituents—whether members of majority or
minority races—who have supported affirmative action over the
years, to segregationists and bigots.”207 Still, his approach’s
consistent demand for such substantive judgments by courts puts
significant stress on their credibility as impartial arbiters of neutral
constitutional commands, such as the command to govern
impartially.
B. The First Amendment
Justice Stevens has expressed similar skepticism about rigid
rules in the First Amendment area. First Amendment jurisprudence is
largely a jurisprudence of rules. For example, court-made rules
distinguish between speech as protected and unprotected;208 laws as
content-based and content-neutral;209 forums as public, non-public,210
and partially public; and libelous publications as addressing matters
of public interest and matters of private concern.211 These distinctions
in turn yield doctrinal rules, such as the strict scrutiny required for
content-based restrictions on speech made in a public forum;212 the
204. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is . . . a critical difference
between a decision to exclude a member of a minority race because of his or her skin color and a
decision to include more members of the minority in a school faculty for that reason.”).
205. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 547–48 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 248 n.5.
208. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
209. E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
210. E.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
211. E.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
212. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding a state
law limiting electioneering speech near polling places after concluding that the law satisfied strict
scrutiny).
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“time, place and manner” test for content-neutral restrictions on
speech made in a public forum;213 and the varying liability standards
required for libel plaintiffs to recover, depending on the nature of the
libelous speech, the type of party libeled, and the type of damages
sought.214
These rules do not self-evidently turn on the language of the
First Amendment. It is true enough that “the freedom of speech” the
Amendment protects might be understood to refer to a particular set
of immunities.215 For example, Justice Thomas has argued that “the
freedom of speech” was never understood to protect the speech of
students in public schools.216 Similarly, the famous Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire217 categories of unprotected speech218 can be
understood as identifying “speech” that is not within the First
Amendment’s concept of “the freedom of speech.” Thus, some of the
rules identified above may, at least at the highest level of generality,
be understandable as textually grounded, or otherwise grounded in
the actual meaning of the constitutional text.219 However, subsidiary
rules—for example, the “actual malice” standard for public official
libel plaintiffs alleging a libel on a matter of public interest—cannot
be understood in such a way.220 They are mediating rules, designed to
provide decisional guideposts for judges to help them reach results
213. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding an ordinance
requiring bands playing in a city-owned bandshell to allow city sound engineers to regulate
volume levels).
214. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (distinguishing between
public-figure and non-public-figure plaintiffs and between the type of damages sought, for
purposes of libel liability standards required by the First Amendment).
215. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 5, at 1296 (“I emphasize the word ‘the’ as used in the term
‘the freedom of speech’ because the definite article suggests that the draftsmen intended to
immunize a previously identified category or subset of speech.”).
216. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.’ Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“The practices and beliefs of the founding generation establish that ‘the freedom of speech,’ as
originally understood, does not include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access
speech) without going through the minors’ parents or guardians.”).
217. 315 U.S. 568 72 (1942).
218. Id. at 571–72.
219. But see Stevens, supra note 5, at 1297 (stating that “[t]his interpretation, though perhaps
plausible as an historical matter, cannot fully capture the meaning of the First Amendment read as
a whole” and going on to identify several broader principles implicit in the First Amendment’s
protection of “the freedom of speech”).
220. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 76–77 (describing the difficulties of “originalism” when
the Constitution’s text is unclear on an issue).
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consistent with the underlying constitutional command. In this sense,
they can be understood as roughly analogous to the tiered scrutiny
structure of equal protection law, with the caveat that they are less
self-consciously created as mediating rules.221
1. Justice Stevens’ Skepticism About
First Amendment Rules
Justice Stevens has expressed dissatisfaction with many of these
rules. Most fundamentally, he has also questioned the primacy of the
content-neutrality requirement. In an address he stated that it is
“beyond dispute” that “the Court routinely departs from the
purported rule against content regulation.”222 In fairness to the Court,
the “rule” against content-based regulation is not a per se rule223 but
rather a requirement that content-based speech restrictions must
satisfy strict scrutiny in order to survive.224 Still, his general point is
well taken: loose, unexplained invocations of a presumption against
content-based speech restrictions collide with the reality that First
Amendment law allows many such restrictions. For example, the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence allows states to distinguish
between liability standards for libel plaintiffs based on the speech’s
content as addressing a matter of public or private concern.225 The
Court also explicitly cast child pornography laws as valid content-

221. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 11, at 480–82 (explaining the mediating role played by the
tiered scrutiny structure).
222. Stevens, supra note 5, at 1304; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[C]ontent-based distinctions, far from being
presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent understanding of
the First Amendment.”).
223. But see Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 124–25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing concern with the
Court’s use of strict scrutiny to evaluate content-based speech distinctions, and suggesting that
they should be per se unconstitutional). See also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898
(2010) (noting Justice Kennedy’s view).
224. Indeed, one of the cases Justice Stevens cited as authority for his statement was one in
which, at least for a plurality, the content-based restriction survived because it satisfied strict
scrutiny. See Stevens, supra note 5, at 1304 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)
(upholding a state restriction on vote solicitation near polling places)).
225. Compare N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284–85 (1964) (establishing an
actual malice First Amendment standard for public officials to recover damages for libel) with
Dun & Bradstreet Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749,760–64 (1985) (establishing
lesser constitutional protection for libelous speech concerning private citizens and matters not of a
public concern).

928

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:889

based restrictions on speech.226 It is not difficult to find additional
examples.227
Justice Stevens has also expressed concern about other First
Amendment rules. He has critiqued other justices’ characterizations
of speech as being of one type or another.228 He has also questioned
the utility of the “public forum” label, contending that it often
obfuscates rather than furthers First Amendment analysis and at any
rate cannot account for the results the Court has reached.229 He has
explicitly embraced the proposition that the First Amendment creates
a rough hierarchy of speech rather than a binary that rigidly classifies
speech as either fully protected or lacking any First Amendment
protection at all.230

226. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (noting libel law in the context
of a discussion of content-based speech restrictions allowed by the Court); see also Stevens,
supra note 5, at 1305 (noting libel law in the context of a discussion of content-based speech
restrictions allowed by the Court). But see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86
(2010) (explaining Ferber as resting on the ground that the production of child pornography was
intimately related to the child abuse inherent in producing it). But see id. at 1592, 1599 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the low value of child pornography was part of the reason the Ferber
Court upheld the state law banning it).
227. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 420–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (providing
examples).
228. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
579 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the speech at issue was not commercial speech, and
thus the speech restriction at issue was inappropriately analyzed as a restriction on commercial
speech).
229. See Stevens, supra note 5, at 1302–03.
230. See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(“[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of
erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest
in untrammeled political debate[.]”); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 422 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in
the constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected
position; commercial speech and non-obscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of
second-class expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all.”); FCC
v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 412 n.4 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing as “obvious” the proposition “that some speech is more worthy than other speech”);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746–48 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concluding that
offensive speech, while protected speech, may nevertheless be entitled to less than full
constitutional protection depending on the context in which it is made); Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 311–12 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the erotic material whose
distribution formed the basis for a federal obscenity prosecution as having “at least a modicum of
First Amendment protection”).
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2. Justice Stevens’ First Amendment Principles
If these rules do not provide a reliable guidance for courts, what
does? In Justice Stevens’ view, it is the First Amendment’s
underlying principles. He has praised cases that “depart from the
prohibition on content-based regulation without undermining its
central goals . . . by supplementing, if not replacing, the black-letter
rule with a sensitivity to fact and context that allows for the
advancement of the principles underlying the protection of free
speech.”231
For Justice Stevens, these principles include the idea that
government may not suppress speech because it disagrees with or
wishes to suppress the viewpoint that speech takes or because it
wishes to keep the public uninformed.232 Thus, for example, in FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation,233 he observed that the Constitution might
have prohibited the FCC from penalizing the broadcaster for airing a
comedy monologue that used offensive language if the agency had
characterized the language as offensive because of its political or
social commentary.234 Conversely, Justice Stevens has argued that
government has a strong First Amendment–based interest in
restricting the speech of government-subsidized speakers in order to
prevent the possibility that those subsidies to speakers will pressure
them into serving as the government’s propaganda mouthpieces.235
231. Stevens, supra note 5, at 1304–05; see also, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–51
(concluding that the particular circumstances of the broadcast medium justify heavier restrictions
on the use of offensive language than might be the case in other contexts). In Pacifica Justice
Stevens approved of the FCC’s use of a nuisance rationale to justify penalizing the broadcaster
for airing an offensive monologue during daylight hours when children might be listening.
Quoting Justice Sutherland’s 1926 opinion upholding zoning laws, he observed that “a ‘nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,—like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard.’” Id. at 750 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)). By
contrast, he made it clear that the constitutional issue would have been more troubling had the
FCC sought to impose the fine because of disagreement with the broadcast’s viewpoint about
offensive speech. See Stevens, supra note 5, at 1303–04.
232. See, e.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing
as “fundamental” the principle “that the citizen’s right to speak may not be conditioned upon the
sovereign’s agreement with what the speaker intends to say”).
233. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
234. Id. at 745–46 (plurality opinion).
235. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 414–15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The statute
[prohibiting public broadcasters from editorializing] does not violate the fundamental principle
that the citizen’s right to speak may not be conditioned upon the sovereign’s agreement with what
the speaker intends to say. On the contrary, the statute was enacted in order to protect that very
principle—to avoid the risk that some speakers will be rewarded or penalized for saying things
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Similarly, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island236 his opinion
distanced itself from a mechanical application of the test generally
used to evaluate commercial speech claims from Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, in favor of an
approach that rested on what he viewed as fundamental First
Amendment principles. He started his analysis of commercial speech
restrictions with the common law, drawing from it (as well as from
early constitutional commercial speech cases) a principle that the
doctrine’s goal was to “serve[] the consumers’ interest in the receipt
of accurate information in the commercial market by prohibiting
fraudulent and misleading advertising.”237 He read the Court’s
seminal commercial speech case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,238 as reflecting “the
conclusion that the same interest that supports regulation of
potentially misleading advertising, namely, the public’s interest in
receiving accurate commercial information, also supports an
interpretation of the First Amendment that provides constitutional
protection for the dissemination of accurate and non-misleading
commercial messages.”239 Thus, Justice Stevens laid out the
rationales for the Court’s commercial speech doctrine in a way that
explained both its strict limits on paternalistic speech regulation and
its exception for restrictions on misleading speech.240
Justice Stevens’ explanation of the Court’s commercial speech
doctrine distantly echoes his approach to race-based government
action. In those equal protection cases he eschewed reliance on a
rigid heightened standard of review in favor of applying a single
equal protection standard to the various contexts. In particular, in

that appeal to—or are offensive to—the sovereign. The interests the statute is designed to protect
are interests that underlie the First Amendment itself.”)
236. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
237. Id. at 496.
238. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
239. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497.
240. See also United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 439 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Bigelow [v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), a precursor case to Virginia
Pharmacy] . . . is about paternalism”).
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applying that single standard Justice Stevens considered carefully the
rationales offered by the government.241
His approach in the commercial speech cases was analogous.
While formal commercial speech doctrine—the Central Hudson
test—builds in a distinction between restrictions on misleading
speech and restrictions on other speech,242 Justice Stevens did not
simply apply the doctrinal test. Instead, he demonstrated how the
doctrine was based on longstanding legal principles that harmonized
both the doctrine’s restrictions on government action and its
exceptions. Indeed, in 44 Liquormart he employed his antipaternalism principle to ratchet up the scrutiny the Court gave to
government restrictions on non-misleading commercial speech, a fact
noted by other justices in that case.243 Thus, in 44 Liquormart Justice
Stevens did not simply mechanically apply an established scrutiny
standard. Rather, as with his approach to equal protection, he applied
an approach animated by an underlying principle he perceived in the
constitutional command.
In addition, as commentators have noted, Justice Stevens has
viewed the First Amendment as a vehicle for ensuring that
marginalized voices are not excluded from discourse.244 In justifying
the decision to accord full First Amendment protection to speech on
the Internet in Reno v. ACLU,245 he described that medium as a “vast
democratic forum[]”246 rather than simply concluding that, as a
privately owned communications resource, it received full First
Amendment protection. In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v.
Village of Stratton,247 a case dealing with an ordinance restricting
door-to-door communication, he led off not with a doctrinaire
characterization of the forum or the ordinance’s content neutrality
241. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 172–76 (explaining how Justice Stevens
distinguished between remedial and forward-looking goals in race-based affirmative action
plans).
242. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
243. See id. at 528, 531–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 518
(Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) (noting and expressing agreement with Justice Stevens’
strong aversion to speech restrictions justified by government paternalism).
244. See, e.g., Gregory Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’ Free Speech
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2201–02 (2006).
245. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
246. Id. at 868.
247. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
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but rather with a discussion of the cases from the 1930s and 1940s
that protected Jehovah’s Witnesses’ speech rights.248 While door-todoor communications may seem a century and a world away from
speech on the Internet, they share the characteristic of allowing broad
participation without regard to economic resources. Justice Stevens’
protection of those speakers—and more importantly, the tenor of his
justifications for that protection—illustrates yet another principle that
is not easily encapsulated in rigid rules such as public forum
doctrine249 or the content-neutrality rule.250
Many of these themes came together in Justice Stevens’
concurring opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.251 R.A.V. involved a
St. Paul ordinance that criminalized the placement on public or
private property of objects or symbols, including a burning cross,
“which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.”252 Several juveniles were charged with violating
this provision when they placed a homemade cross in a black
family’s yard and lit it on fire.
The Court unanimously struck down the law, but divided badly
in its reasoning. Justice Scalia, writing for five justices, condemned
the law as a content- and viewpoint-based restriction on speech. He
assumed that the law merely banned “fighting words,” which enjoy
no constitutional protection.253 However, he concluded that even laws
banning such unprotected speech were subject to the contentneutrality requirement.254 Applying strict scrutiny, he concluded that
the law had to be struck down.255
248. Id. at 160–64; see also id. at 161 (“Although our past cases involving Jehovah’s
Witnesses . . . do not directly control the question we confront today, they provide both a
historical and analytical backdrop for consideration of petitioners’ First Amendment claim.”).
249. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburg Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114,
152–55 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (eschewing reliance on the forum status of a mailbox
when considering a federal law prohibiting the depositing of unstamped letters in mailboxes, and
considering instead the extent to which the law served legitimate government interests and
prevented low-cost communication between neighbors).
250. Professor Magarian has also explained how this same impulse has affected Justice
Stevens’ approach to minor parties’ access to the ballot. See Magarian, supra note 244, at 2221–
25.
251. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
252. Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02).
253. Id. at 391.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 394–96.
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Justice White, writing for the remaining four justices (including
Justice Stevens), agreed that the law was unconstitutional. But he
based his decision on his conclusion that the law was overbroad
because it criminalized not just fighting words but protected speech
as well.256 In a part of Justice White’s opinion that Justice Stevens
declined to join, Justice White criticized Justice Scalia’s application
of the content-neutrality requirement to government restriction of
unprotected speech. In Justice White’s view, the status of certain
speech as outside the First Amendment’s protection meant that
government had a free hand in regulating it.257
Justice Stevens took issue with both approaches.258 First, he
criticized the rigidity of the majority’s content-neutrality analysis. He
argued that the presumptive ban on content-based speech restrictions
did not reflect the reality of the Court’s jurisprudence, which he
characterized as reflecting widespread recognition that content is a
valid basis for classifying speech restrictions as valid or invalid.259
However, at the same time he also took issue with Justice
White’s view that if the ordinance had banned only constitutionally
unprotected “fighting words,” the city would have enjoyed complete
latitude to pick and choose which fighting words to ban.260 In his
view, Justice White’s “categorical approach”261 was just as
inappropriately rigid as Justice Scalia’s presumption of
unconstitutionality for any content-based restriction. He summed up
his disagreement as follows: “Unlike the Court, I do not believe that
all content-based regulations are equally infirm and presumptively
invalid; unlike Justice White, I do not believe that fighting words are
wholly unprotected by the First Amendment.”262
Thus, Justice Stevens agreed that fighting words enjoyed lesser
constitutional protection but did so by placing them along a
continuum of protection, rather than as part of a binary

256. Id. at 411, 414 (White, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 400, 403.
258. Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 419–22.
260. Compare id. at 426–28 (Justice Stevens’ explanation of the shortfalls of the categorical
approach), with id. at 400–01 (White, J., concurring) (Justice White’s explanation of why the
categorical approach should apply in this case).
261. Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., concurring).
262. Id. at 428.
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distinguishing between fully protected and wholly unprotected
speech. More generally, he argued that factors such as the contentbased nature of the restriction, the forum in which the speech took
place, and the definitions of certain types of speech (e.g., obscenity)
were all sufficiently murky that a categorical approach based on
those criteria “fits poorly with the complex reality of expression.”263
In evaluating the claim before him, he found a number of factors
to be relevant: the relatively unprotected nature of the speech,264 its
character as expressive conduct (cross-burning) rather than pure
speech,265 and the regulation’s viewpoint-neutral character, which
indicated that the ban did not reflect a government attempt to skew
public debate.266 In his view, these factors would have rendered the
St. Paul ordinance constitutional had it in fact been confined to
fighting words.267 In its self-conscious consideration of a variety of
factors and skepticism about categorical rules,268 Justice Stevens’
opinion in R.A.V. reflected his general approach to the First
Amendment.
II. JUSTICE STEVENS’ FINAL TERM:
RULES AND STANDARDS IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Justice Stevens’ last term on the Court gave him a final
opportunity to reflect on the relative appropriateness of rules and
standards in First Amendment law. In two cases, Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission and Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, Justice Stevens demonstrated, through his votes as well as
his pen, that he remained skeptical of rigid rules.
A. Citizens United v. FEC
In Citizens United the Court struck down the part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002269 (BCRA) that limited
263. Id. at 426.
264. Id. 432.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 434–35. Indeed, Justice Stevens argued that the St. Paul ordinance was not even
content-based, as it targeted speech not based on its content, but on the harms it caused. Id. at
433–34.
267. See id. at 393–94 (majority opinion); id. at 411 (White, J., concurring); id. at 436
(Stevens, J., concurring).
268. See id. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring).
269. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in
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corporations’ and unions’ rights to spend general treasury funds to
pay for speech advocating a federal political candidate’s election or
defeat.270 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the five-justice majority was
bold and aggressive. He rejected the option of deciding in favor of
the speaker on narrower grounds,271 in favor of an approach that
required him to revisit and overrule two cases partially or
completely, including one decided just seven years before.272 In
evaluating the speaker’s claim Justice Kennedy noted his own view
that restrictions on political speech were per se unconstitutional
before applying the more generally accepted rule that such contentbased restrictions merit strict scrutiny.273 He also noted that BCRA’s
singling out of corporations and unions constituted an identity-based
restriction on speech, which he described as “prohibited,” except in
the limited case in which such restrictions were necessary to allow
“governmental entities to perform their functions.”274
Justice Kennedy’s analysis thus reflected stringent, nearly
categorical limits on government’s ability to restrict speech. As I
have elsewhere described his opinion, Justice Kennedy
weaved his way through pre-Buckley275 precedent that
appeared to allow such identity-based restrictions,276
explained away Buckley’s failure to strike down an identityscattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.).
270. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917. In particular, BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2006),
prohibited corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to air ads in the immediate
pre-election period that either endorsed or attacked a particular candidate or constituted
“electioneering communications.” Id. at 887 (explaining BCRA’s restrictions).
271. See id. at 888–92 (explaining the Court’s rationale for refusing to consider the parties’
arguments for deciding the case on narrow bases).
272. Id. at 896–914 (discussing and overruling, in whole or in part, previous Supreme Court
cases Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
273. See id. at 898 (“While it might be maintained that political speech simply cannot be
banned or restricted as a categorical matter, see [Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 150, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)],
the quoted language from [Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 151 U.S. 449
(2007), requiring strict scrutiny of such restrictions] provides a sufficient framework for
protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this case. We shall employ it here.”).
274. Id. at 899 (citing cases dealing with speech by students, prisoners, military personnel,
and federal employees).
275. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Supreme Court’s first seminal case on campaign
finance reform).
276. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899–901 (discussing previous restrictions on corporate
and union political contributions).
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based speech restriction in the law it otherwise exhaustively
reviewed,277 minimized or ignored cases between Bellotti278
and Austin279 that upheld identity-based restrictions on
political speech,280 severely criticized the rationales in
Austin that implied the appropriateness of identity-based
restrictions,281 and rejected the argument that an interest in
fighting government corruption or (in the case of corporate
restrictions) protecting dissenting shareholders could justify
limits on corporate or union speech.282283
Justice Kennedy’s skeptical attitude toward identity- and
content-based discrimination also led him to refuse to defer to
congressional determinations about the importance of these
regulations in ensuring a corruption-free electoral system.284 Such
refusals to defer are part of the normal strict scrutiny standard. While
at times the Court has conceded, even in the First Amendment area,
that deference to Congress’s predictive judgments is warranted in
areas of complex policymaking,285 this recognition has existed in
substantial tension with the Court’s repeated statements that
protection of First Amendment rights requires careful scrutiny of the
legislature’s findings.286

277. See id. at 902 (“Buckley did not consider § 610’s separate ban on corporate and union
independent expenditures . . . . Had § 610 been challenged in the wake of Buckley, however, it
could not have been squared with the reasoning and analysis of that precedent.”).
278. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
279. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
280. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (transitioning directly from Bellotti to Austin,
without considering cases such as FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986),
and FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982), that upheld identity-based
restrictions).
281. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904–08.
282. See id. at 908–11.
283. William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens and Humanitarian Law Project: First
Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REV. 821, 825 (2011) (footnotes
in original).
284. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
285. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (emphasizing deference
to Congress for regulation of the cable television industry); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 665 (1994) (same); see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
103 (1972) (emphasizing deference to Congress for regulation of the radio broadcast industry).
286. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731, 2739 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
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Justice Kennedy did not explicitly engage the deference
question. However, he did strongly suggest that such deference
would be inappropriate:
When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give
that finding due deference; but Congress may not choose an
unconstitutional remedy . . . . We must give weight to
attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance
or the reality of [corrupting] influences. The remedies
enacted by law, however, must comply with the First
Amendment; and, it is our tradition that more speech, not
less, is the governing rule.287
While Justice Kennedy did not explicitly engage this question, at
oral argument Justice Scalia, another member of the Citizens United
majority, did. He repeated the view that he had expressed in prior
writing that campaign finance restrictions generally operated to the
benefit of incumbents, who therefore should not be trusted to make
findings regarding the necessity for such regulations.288
Justice Stevens wrote a long and detailed dissent for four
justices.289 For our purposes, the most notable part of his opinion was
his sharp critique of Justice Kennedy’s categorical analysis. He
criticized as a “glittering generality” Justice Kennedy’s statement
that the First Amendment prohibited identity-based distinctions
between speakers.290 He provided a long list of cases in which the
Court had upheld such distinctions and challenged Justice Kennedy’s
explanation that they could be distinguished as cases in which the
government was in a managerial or custodial relationship with the
speakers.291

287. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (alteration added).
288. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 50–51, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205).
As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia had expressed
this view in their dissenting opinions in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), one of the
opinions partially overruled by Citizens United. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 969 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 249–50, 260–63 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) and McConnell, 540 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part)).
289. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
290. Id. at 930.
291. See id. at 945–48.
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Justice Stevens also engaged the deference point.292 He criticized
as “airy speculation” the idea that campaign finance regulation
inherently favored incumbents.293 He recognized the risk that such
regulation might be motivated by legislators’ desire to insulate
themselves from challengers.294 However, consistent with his distrust
of categorical rules and the practices (such as refusals to defer) that
accompany them, he rejected a skepticism based on such nonempirical speculation in favor of a “conscientious policing for
impermissibly anticompetitive motive or effect in a sensitive First
Amendment context.”295
Together, the justices’ disagreements on these two issues—the
presumptive unconstitutionality of content- and identity-based
speech distinctions and the deference to legislative judgments
supporting those distinctions—throw into sharp relief Justice
Stevens’ overall approach to the First Amendment. He rejected a
rigid embrace of the rule against content- and identity-based
distinctions because he found that rule to be inconsistent with the
Court’s precedent.296 Instead, he insisted on an inquiry into whether
this particular distinction promoted or impeded a core free speech
value derived from the First Amendment itself.297 His rejection of
such categorical rules then led him to reject the Court’s skeptical
view of Congress’s determination of the need for campaign finance
regulation.298 Still, consistent with his refusal to apply rigid
presumptions in either direction, he called not for deference to
Congress’s views but for the type of “conscientious policing”299 for
292. Id. at 968–70.
293. Id. at 969.
294. Id. at 970.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 942–48.
297. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“It is fair to say that our First Amendment doctrine has frowned on certain identity-based
distinctions, particularly those that may reflect invidious discrimination or preferential treatment
of a politically powerful group. But it is simply incorrect to suggest that we have prohibited all
legislative distinctions based on identity or content.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also id. at 947 (“[C]orporate spending is . . . furthest from the core of political
expression, since corporations’ First Amendment speech and association interests are derived
largely from those of their members and of the public in receiving information.” (quoting FEC v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 n.8 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
298. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968–70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
299. Id. at 970.
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bad motives that was appropriate “in a sensitive First Amendment
context.”300
B. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
In Humanitarian Law Project the Court upheld a statute banning
provision of “material support” to named terrorist groups.301 The
statute applied to individuals who wished to work with those groups
by teaching them how to use international forums for peaceful
dispute resolution.302 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a six-justice
majority, rejected the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment vagueness and
First Amendment association and speech claims.303 In considering the
speech claim, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the government’s
argument that the Court should apply the “intermediate scrutiny”304
performed under United States v. O’Brien305 when the government
regulated expressive conduct. Chief Justice Roberts recognized that
application of the material support statute to the plaintiffs’ conduct
was not unrelated to the conduct’s expression, a conclusion that
rendered O’Brien inapplicable.306 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts
described the government action in Humanitarian Law Project as a
content-based regulation of speech307 that therefore required
application of “a more demanding standard.”308
Thus, the Court set up the case as if it were applying some level
of particularly heightened scrutiny. It described the insufficiently
rigorous O’Brien standard as “intermediate,” stated that it was
applying “a more demanding standard,” and characterized the
government action as a content-based speech restriction—the type of
government action that normally elicits strict scrutiny.309 Yet, the
300. Id.
301. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006).
302. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2010).
303. Id. at 2731. The dissenting justices agreed that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague. See id.
304. Id. at 2723 (describing the scrutiny performed under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968)).
305. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
306. Id. at 377.
307. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723.
308. Id. at 2724 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)).
309. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 117–18 (1991).
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Court’s application of this supposedly heightened scrutiny was
surprisingly mild. Chief Justice Roberts deferred to Congress’s
finding that all assistance to terrorist groups was fungible, on the
theory that all of it contributed to the group’s ability to engage in
violence.310 The evidence on this point consisted mainly of an
affidavit from a State Department official.311
The Court also adopted further glosses on standard heightened
scrutiny. Most notably, it failed to perform any significant narrow
tailoring analysis.312 It did note that Congress had imposed limits on
the statute’s prohibitions.313 But, of course, strict scrutiny does not
normally stop with the question of whether the legislature itself
limits its regulations’ scope. Rather, a court must be independently
convinced that those limits are adequate to satisfy the narrow
tailoring requirement.
Two further points about the majority are notable. First, Chief
Justice Roberts went out of his way to limit the scope of his analysis.
He noted that the Court was not deciding the constitutionality of
restrictions on independent speech—that is, speech supporting
terrorist groups made without coordination with those groups. He
also disclaimed any judgment on application of the material support
statute to coordinated speech in support of domestic terrorist groups.
Second, he closed his opinion with quotations from the
Constitution’s preamble and the Federalist Papers that noted the
centrality of national defense as one of the Constitution’s great
objects.314
Justice Breyer’s dissent criticized the Court’s First Amendment
analysis.315 Applying standard First Amendment doctrine, he first
310. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725–26. In fairness, it should be noted
that the Court announced that it was independently convinced of this linkage. Nevertheless, the
Court announced that it was deferring to Congress’s judgment on this issue. That statement would
have been superfluous had the Court been willing to rest its conclusion on its own estimation of
the evidence.
311. See id. at 2725–35. Indeed, the affidavit was produced in 1998, before the enactment of
the original version of the statute challenged in Humanitarian Law Project, apparently as part of
an earlier phrase of the Humanitarian Law Project litigation. See Joint Appendix at 127,
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 3877534.
312. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 476–82 (2007) (applying narrow
tailoring to a content-based speech restriction).
313. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2728.
314. See id. at 2731.
315. Justice Breyer and the other two dissenters (Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor) agreed
with the majority that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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considered whether the speech fell outside the boundaries of First
Amendment protection. Having decided that it did not, he suggested
that strict scrutiny—a term never used by the majority—was the
appropriate standard.
Even applying the majority’s vague “more demanding
standard,” he questioned whether the statute satisfied normal First
Amendment requirements. He criticized the Court’s reliance on
Congress’s findings about the fungibility of aid, concluding that
those findings were too general to support the constitutionality of the
restriction on the speech the plaintiffs wanted to make. He also
critiqued the justification that the type of assistance the plaintiffs
wanted to provide tended to legitimate the group, arguing that that
reasoning swept in too much protected speech. In turn, he argued that
any line between restricted and unrestricted speech legitimating the
group would be so vague as to chill protected speech.
The point of this discussion is not to evaluate the merits of the
two sides’ arguments. Terrorism poses difficult free speech questions
for both courts and policymakers. For our purposes, the relevant
issue in Humanitarian Law Project is the workability of rigid
doctrinal rules in free speech law and in constitutional law more
generally. On that point, it is notable that the majority that
announced and deployed such rules so confidently in Citizens United
engaged in such contextual, nuanced review in Humanitarian Law
Project.316 In Humanitarian Law Project, Chief Justice Roberts
described the challenged application of the statute as a content-based
speech restriction.317 However, he did not explicitly apply strict
scrutiny. Beyond semantics (as telling as they are), the “more
demanding scrutiny” he did apply was curiously muted. He deferred
to Congress’s highly general conclusions about the fungibility of aid
to terrorist groups, based largely on a litigation-driven affidavit. He
did not seriously consider the possibility that the type of aid the
plaintiffs wished to provide might further Congress’s goals in
preventing terrorist attacks on Americans.318 Nor did he seriously

316. The majorities in these two cases consisted of exactly the same judges, except for Justice
Stevens, who dissented in Citizens United and joined the majority in Humanitarian Law Project.
317. See id. at 2723–24 (majority opinion).
318. See id. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (making this point).
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consider whether the statute’s sweep was overbroad or risked
chilling protected speech. This is surely heightened scrutiny lite.319
Returning to the focus on Justice Stevens, the interesting point
about Humanitarian Law Project is that he abandoned the liberal
bloc and joined Chief Justice Roberts’ majority. Humanitarian Law
Project was one of the very last decisions in which Justice Stevens
participated. Combined with Citizens United, it constitutes an apt
summation of his approach to First Amendment issues and to
constitutional adjudication more generally. Most notably, both cases
reveal his skepticism about rigid rules and his focus on deciding the
case in front of him. His dissenting opinion in Citizens United
reflected these principles more explicitly—hardly a surprising
observation in light of the fact that Justice Stevens wrote it. But
Humanitarian Law Project’s vague incantation of “more demanding
scrutiny” and deference to legislative judgments and line-drawing
reflect the more nuanced, less categorical approach that Justice
Stevens took throughout his career and that infused his Citizens
United dissent. Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’ insistence that he
was deciding only the case in front of him, not making sweeping
pronouncements about the First Amendment, and—perhaps
paradoxically—his concluding rhetorical flourish hearkening back to
constitutional first principles, both find an easy fit with Justice
Stevens’ approach that sought to decide the case in front of him320
based on broad standards derived from the Constitution itself.321
Indeed, a fascinating thread running through the majority’s
opinion in Humanitarian Law Project and Justice Stevens’ dissent in
Citizens United illustrates a skepticism about rigid rules. In Citizens
United, Justice Stevens ridiculed Justice Kennedy’s claim that
identity-based
speech
restrictions
were
nearly
always
unconstitutional by suggesting, rhetorically, that under the majority’s
319. Indeed, I have described Humanitarian Law Project as the Roberts Court’s version of
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), in which the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny to
a university’s use of race as an admissions criterion, but largely deferred to the university’s
judgments and did not insist on narrow tailoring. Araiza, supra note 283, at 830–33.
320. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 5, at 1307–08 (questioning the litigation strategy of the
broadcaster in Pacifica for making a broad First Amendment claim instead of one that focused on
the likely “meager” offense the broadcast actually caused).
321. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430–31 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that viewpoint-based speech restrictions are especially
pernicious because they violate core constitutional principles prohibiting the government from
skewing debate or restricting discussion of ideas because the government finds them offensive).
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approach Tokyo Rose would have had a First Amendment right to
speak during World War II.322 Similarly, in Humanitarian Law
Project, Chief Justice Roberts mocked the dissent’s strict scrutiny
analysis by suggesting that the dissent would have found a
constitutional right to instruct Imperial Japanese officials in methods
of international dispute resolution during World War II.323 We may
never know if the appearance of strikingly similar analogies in these
two opinions was anything more than coincidental. But, for our
purposes, what is clear is the important point those analogies make:
both Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Roberts were arguing that, at
least in some cases, rigid rules simply do not make good sense.
III. RULES AND STANDARDS EVALUATED:
THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE STEVENS
Justice Stevens’ equal protection and free speech jurisprudence
forces us to confront the limitations of both rigid doctrinal rules
mediating between vague constitutional text and judicial decisions
and his own standards-based approach that aspires to be more closely
tethered to constitutional text and principle. From his earliest years
on the Court324 to one of his last major constitutional law opinions,325
Justice Stevens expressed skepticism about mediating rules such as
the content-neutrality rule and the tiered structure of equal
protection. Most notably, he protested what he viewed as talismanic
incantations of those rules as a replacement for more direct
applications of principles derived from the constitutional text to the
challenged government action, in light of the facts and context of the
case.
To evaluate his approach, it may be helpful to clarify the status
of the rules Justice Stevens protested. The tiered scrutiny structure of
equal protection is much closer than the First Amendment’s contentneutrality rule to being a pure mediating rule.326 The very idea of
322. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
323. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2730.
324. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is
only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct
the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”).
325. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
326. Scholars have argued that almost all constitutional analysis performed by courts involves
application of a mediating rule of one sort or another. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman,
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according heightened scrutiny to some classifications reflects a sense
that “suspect” classifications are more likely to violate equal
protection’s core command. As Justice Kennedy argued in
Adarand—responding to Justice Stevens’ complaint about the Court
not knowing the difference between exclusionary and inclusionary
use of race—strict scrutiny serves to illuminate that difference by
“smok[ing] out” illegitimate uses of race.327 Thus, strict scrutiny in
this context plays an indirect role in uncovering constitutional
meaning. This is consistent with the foundational theory of the tiered
scrutiny structure from Carolene Products. The theory is best
understood not as reflecting direct constitutional meaning, but as
simply illuminating what equal protection likely requires by
considering the degree to which the burdened group is presumed to
have been able to influence the legislature.328
By contrast, the content-neutrality rule comes closer to
reflecting direct constitutional meaning, by implementing a principle
that the government lacks the authority to dictate the topics suitable
for public discourse. In this sense, the content-neutrality rule serves,
at least to some degree, as a competing principle to Justice Stevens’
own direct constitutional principle that the government may not
suppress a message because it disagrees with it. Still, the contentneutrality rule is significantly more rigid than Justice Stevens’
preferred principle. As expressed by its most fervent advocate,
Justice Kennedy, it stands for the proposition that any content-based
speech restriction is per se unconstitutional.329 The majority of the
Court has not accepted Justice Kennedy’s view.330 Still, even the
strict scrutiny applied by the Court reflects a significantly more rigid
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2004). This may be true. Nevertheless, this
does not obviate the fact that Justice Stevens’ approach, especially to equal protection, aspires to
a much more direct application of constitutional meaning than the Court’s self-consciously
indirect method of tiered scrutiny review.
327. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (quoting City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
328. See Araiza, supra note 11, at 481–82.
329. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898–99;
see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (insisting on a
per se rule against infringements on speech).
330. Compare Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108–23 (applying strict scrutiny to a contentbased speech restriction), with id. at 124–25 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(questioning the use of strict scrutiny).
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approach to speech restrictions than Justice Stevens’ approach,
especially when the content-neutrality rule is combined with the
Court’s other rigid speech rules.331 While the point is not as obvious
as with the Court’s tiered scrutiny structure in equal protection, the
ostensible332 rigidity of the content-neutrality rule suggests its
mediating nature, as opposed to its nature as a direct statement of
constitutional principle. At any rate, as with his approach to equal
protection, Justice Stevens’ approach to the First Amendment
requires more contextualized, nuanced judgments than the Court’s
approach.
Thus, Justice Stevens’ approach to equality and speech issues
brings us back to the fundamental questions asked early in this
Article about the relative usefulness of rigid rules and more nuanced,
but less definite, standards.333 Do rigid rules do a better job at
constraining judicial discretion? Are mediating rules a necessary evil
in light of the impossibility of deriving sufficiently precise meaning,
translatable into reasonably clear guidance to lower courts, directly
from the Constitution’s text? And, finally, which approach better
reflects the judicial humility that Chief Justice Roberts expressed in
his confirmation hearings?
As one might expect, the answers to these questions cannot be
definite. Constitutional adjudication is a difficult job in terms of both
the intellectual demands it places on judges and the temptation to
reach results that comport with one’s moral preferences—especially
when a judge sits on a court of final review. This Article has already
made clear some of the pitfalls of both approaches. Still, a few final
thoughts may be in order.
First, it is not at all clear that Justice Stevens’ approach provided
him with appreciably more discretion than that of the Court. As
Professor Siegel has noted, Justice Stevens’ results in equal
protection cases did not significantly diverge from those of his
331. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion) (recognizing
that a restriction on the broadcaster’s speech would be more problematic if it were based on
disagreement with the speech’s message, as compared with a concern for the children in the
listening audience, in a medium uniquely accessible to children); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 416–36 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (reviewing the speech
restriction at issue based on the nature of the speech, the nature of the restriction, and the context
of the speech).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 241–55, 256–87; Stevens, supra note 5, at 1304.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 21–25.
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colleagues,334 even if his pattern was somewhat idiosyncratic.335
While this observation does not necessarily indicate cabined
discretion, it at least suggests that Justice Stevens’ approach did not
give him free rein to vote whichever way his heart took him.
Moreover, the Court itself has not been particularly consistent in its
approach to equal protection and free speech cases. The Court that
confidently applied a searching form of strict scrutiny to the racebased set-asides in Croson and Adarand also deferred to the
University of Michigan Law School’s justifications for raceconscious action in Grutter v. Bollinger.336 More generally, the
Court’s application of rational basis review has, over the last quartercentury, been subject to notable inconsistencies.337 Moreover, its sex
equality jurisprudence has significantly evolved even within the
confines of the same ostensible standard in effect since 1976.338 In
the First Amendment area, the Court that struck down St. Paul’s
cross-burning ordinance in R.A.V. as a content-based speech
restriction upheld the bulk of Virginia’s cross-burning law in
Virginia v. Black.339 And, of course, its review of the content-based
speech restriction challenged in Citizens United was significantly
different from its review of the content-based restriction challenged
in Humanitarian Law Project.340
All of these seeming inconsistencies can be explained by
differences in the challenged laws or the procedural postures or
factual backgrounds of the cases. But that is precisely the point: the
Court retains the ability to distinguish earlier cases and reach
different results while ostensibly applying the same rigid rule. Thus,
334. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 2361–62.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 140–44.
336. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
337. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s Amendment 2 as
irrational discrimination against gays, lesbians and bisexuals); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down a town’s refusal to grant a permit for a
group home for mentally retarded people as unconstitutionally irrational); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down as unconstitutionally irrational a federal refusal to
provide food-stamp assistance to households comprised of unrelated persons).
338. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (requiring that sex
classifications have an “exceedingly persuasive justification”), with id. at 566–603 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (complaining that the Court was manipulating the scrutiny standard without being
forthright about it).
339. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
340. See generally supra Part II (discussing the majority’s approaches in Citizens United and
Humanitarian Law Project).
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application of such rules does not substantially cabin the Court’s
discretion to reach the result it thinks appropriate.
This realization suggests that rigid rules are not enough to cabin
judicial discretion. Rather, what is also needed is a more formalistic
application of those rules. Such an approach would rightly be
criticized as what Justice Frankfurter once described as “falsifying
the actual process of judging.”341 Of course, Justice Frankfurter was
well known for his unwillingness to be bound by rigid rules unless
they were textually compelled;342 thus, one cannot simply rest on his
critique of formalistic application of rules as the final word. Still, the
realization that rules are not enough—that the consistency benefit of
rules comes only when those rules are mechanically applied—is a
telling criticism of the position that rules are useful mechanisms for
judges seeking to tie themselves to the mast.
Second, it is not clear that Justice Stevens’ attempt at
unmediated constitutional interpretation was a complete failure. As
noted above, his results were neither out of the Court’s mainstream
nor any less internally inconsistent. On the other hand, one can
question the credibility of his pronouncements in the race cases about
a judge’s ability always to know the difference between a welcome
mat and a “No Trespassing” sign.343 Similarly, one can worry that his
views about when a law violates one of his First Amendment
principles are not so self-evident that other judges applying those
same principles would reach the same results in similar cases.
These observations suggest that judicial review based on a direct
application of vague constitutional text or constitutional principles
may be problematic, especially for appellate judges whose duty
includes providing intelligible guidance to lower court judges. But,
on the other hand, one can discern these same problems with the
mediating rules the Court adopts. They, too, require substantive
judgments.344 In addition, the Court’s inconsistent application of
those rules has led critics to complain that lower courts would face
341. Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
342. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1526 (2006).
343. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
344. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (explaining that careful
review of sex classifications does not cast doubt on sex classifications intended to promote
women’s equal status).
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serious difficulty conscientiously following the Court’s guidance.345
If the choice is between mediating rules, which entail judges making
substantive value judgments and reaching results that may be
difficult for lower courts to replicate, and unmediated interpretation
that raises the same problems, an argument can be made for the latter
simply on the ground that it at least is more closely anchored to the
text.
These two points require consideration of how well the Court’s
own approach has performed. While a generalization at such a high
level is obviously hazardous, it appears as though the Court’s
approach, like Newtonian physics, does a good job at producing
consistent, predictable results in most cases, but breaks down in the
harder ones.346 The cases from the October 2009 term illustrate this
point. Campaign finance is a difficult issue. It involves core political
speech that, if one were to rank all speech in terms of its First
Amendment centrality, would be at the very top.347 On the other
hand, the government interests in regulating that speech—prevention
of corruption and the appearance of corruption that demoralizes the
citizenry and leads them to disengage from self-government—are
among the most compelling government can offer. Similarly, the
speech in Humanitarian Law Project deals with commentary on core
matters of government policy. Yet, the prevention of terrorism is
unquestionably a compelling government interest. The majorities in
Citizens United and Humanitarian Law Project are disappointing in
their inconsistent approaches to the difficult choices presented by
these issues. Citizens United was a classic rule-based opinion.
Humanitarian Law Project, while it genuflected in that direction,
was considerably more nuanced. Neither approach is necessarily

345. See, e.g., id. at 566–70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining about the majority’s sub
silentio alteration to the intermediate scrutiny standard for sex classifications); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (expressing
sympathy for lower courts faced with the task of following the majority’s application of rational
basis review).
346. Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring) (“Reviewing speech regulations under fairly strict categorical rules keeps
the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting
what may be said.”).
347. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (“The First Amendment
has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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right or wrong. Yet, it is surely disheartening to see the Court act so
inconsistently within the space of a few months.348
But not Justice Stevens. As noted early in this Article, Justice
Stevens was the only Justice on the Court to adopt methodologically
consistent approaches in these two cases. This fact goes to the third
criterion for judging him and the Court: humility. Both approaches
discussed in this Article have their advantages. Both present
problems. But one might hope that a humble judge—a judge who
aspires to act like a judge rather than a policymaker—approaches
cases consistently when they present a similar challenge, such as that
provided by a vague constitutional text. Indeed, in a sense, the largest
constraint on judges may be a methodological one. This point has
been made, for example, by commentators who criticize justices who
adopt a stridently originalist method in one case and then fail even to
mention it in another.349
In sum, one thing we can appreciate about Justice Stevens’
approach to equal protection and free speech issues is his larger-scale
consistency. His approach in these areas may be subject to fair
criticism. But whatever one might think about his approach, neither
the current Court’s rules-based approach nor its broader
methodological inconsistency cabins judicial discretion, leads to
predictable or replicable results, or reflects genuine humility about
the judicial role.
Not even close.350

348. For an especially tart accusation of the Court acting inconsistently in a short timeframe,
see Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 274 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). “The
judgment just announced is irreconcilable in principle with the judgment in Borden’s Case, [297
U.S. 251], announced a minute or so earlier.” Id.
349. See, e.g., Book Note, Justice Thomas’s Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1431, 1435 (2008) (reviewing CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR
(2007)); Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet: McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Limits of
Progressive Originalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 369, 398 (2010) (citing scholars making
this claim); David A. Strauss, On the Origin of Rules (with Apologies to Darwin): A Comment on
Antonin Scalia’s The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 997, 1010–13 (2008)
(arguing that Justice Scalia’s originalist methodology is inconsistent with his analysis of the Sixth
Amendment issue in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
350. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945–46 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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